A Structural Model of Segregation in Social Networks

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November 1, 2011

Abstract

The main challenges in estimating strategic network formation models are the presence of multiple equilibria, and the fact that the number of possible network configurations increases exponentially with the number of players. I propose a dynamic model of strategic network formation which converges to a unique stationary equilibrium. As a consequence, the structural parameters can be estimated using a single network observation. Since maximum likelihood estimation is computationally infeasible, I propose a Bayesian estimation strategy that reduces the computational burden, allowing inference in high-dimensional models. I prove that the proposed algorithm converges to the correct posterior distribution. Using Add Health data, I investigate racial segregation in school friendship networks and find that students prefer interactions with individuals of the same race. The simulation of several desegregation programs shows that equalizing the schools’ racial compositions may not be optimal, and some desegregation plans could decrease welfare and increase friendship segregation.

JEL Codes: D85, C15, C73

Keywords: Social Networks, Bayesian Estimation, Markov Chain Monte Carlo

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†I am grateful to Roger Koenker for continuous encouragement, advice, financial support and for the use of his computer cluster. I thank Ron Laschever for long and fruitful discussions about this research project. Dan Bernhardt and George Deltas have provided several inputs at crucial stages of this work. I thank Alberto Bisin, Ethan Cole, Aureo de Paula, Steven Durlauf, Andrea Galeotti, Shweta Gaonkar, Sanjeev Goyal, Dan Karney, Darren Lubotsky, Antonio Mele, Luca Merlino, Tom Parker, Dennis O’Dea, Micah Pollak, Sergey Popov, Sudipta Sarangi, Giorgio Topa, Antonella Tutino and seminar participants at SED Meetings 2010, Add Health Users Conference 2010, University of Notre Dame, Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School, University of Pennsylvania, Southern Methodist University, FED Board, UQAM, SBIES 2011, PET 2011, Conference on Networks in Cambridge, UK for helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Andriy Norets and Matt Jackson for suggesting references on how to prove and bound convergence of the algorithms. Financial support from the R. Ferber Award, the R. W. Harbeson Memorial Dissertation Fellowship, and the NET Institute Summer Research Grant 2010 is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.

‡This research uses data from Add Health, a program project designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Persons interested in obtaining Data Files from Add Health should contact Add Health, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (addhealth@unc.edu). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.

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1 Introduction

Social networks are important determinants of individuals’ socioeconomic performance. An increasing amount of evidence shows that the number and composition of social ties affects employment prospects, school performance, risky behavior, adoption of new technologies, diffusion of information and health outcomes. The structure of social ties is endogenous: individuals choose their peers and friends according to their socioeconomic characteristics and their relationships. As a consequence, in socially generated networks the agents are likely to interact with similar individuals (homophily), segregating along socioeconomic attributes. This paper develops a structural model and estimation methods to study the determinants of such segregated network structures.

The economics literature has relied on two complementary approaches to model the process of network formation. Strategic models interpret the network as equilibrium outcome of a strategic game, in which rational players choose their social ties by weighing the costs and benefits of each link. Structural estimation of strategic models is challenging, because the process of link formation generates externalities: individuals benefit from indirect links created by other players. As a result, these models have multiple equilibria, a feature that greatly complicates the identification of structural parameters. Furthermore, strategic models suffer a curse of dimensionality: the number of possible network structures increases exponentially with the number of players. Therefore the computation of equilibria may require an infeasible number of calculations for networks with a large number of players. On the other hand, in random network formation models, the network is the realization of a stochastic process. Each link occurs with some probability and the model characterizes the likelihood of observing a specific network configuration. While these models are able to match several important characteristics of social network data (high clustering, homophily, diameter) and their estimation is relatively standard, they lack the equilibrium microfoundation of the strategic models, limiting their use for policy analysis.

This paper develops and estimates a strategic model of dynamic network formation with heterogeneous agents. Preferences are defined over individual socioeconomic characteristics

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1For example, see the contributions of Topa (2001); Laschever (2009); Cooley (2010); De Giorgi et al. (2010); Nakajima (2007); Bandiera and Rasul (2006); Conley and Udry (forthcoming); Golub and Jackson (2011); Acemoglu et al. (2011).


4Comola (2010) and Mayer and Puller (2008) are examples of structural models where multiple equilibria may arise.

and network structures. Each period a random player is selected from the population and he meets another agent, according to a meeting technology. Upon meeting, the player has the opportunity to revise his linking strategy: a link is created (or maintained, if already in place) if and only if the utility of the additional link is positive.

I prove and characterize the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium, which provides the likelihood of observing a specific network architecture in the long run. The absence of multiple equilibria is crucial in estimation: assuming that the network observed in the data is drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model, the structural parameters can be estimated using only one observation of the network at a single point in time.

I estimate the posterior distribution of the structural parameters, using a Bayesian approach. The main challenge is that the model’s likelihood is proportional to an intractable normalizing constant, that cannot be evaluated or approximated with precision. To overcome this problem, I propose a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that generates samples from the posterior distribution without evaluating the likelihood. I prove that the algorithm converges to the correct posterior distribution and therefore the sample averages of the algorithm’s output can be used to approximate posterior expectations. Using several properties of the model, I am able to decrease the computational burden even further, allowing inference in high dimensional models.

I present an application to the study of segregation in school friendship networks, using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). This unique database contains detailed information on friendship networks of students enrolled in a representative sample of US schools. The final sample contains 14 schools with a total of 1139 students.\(^6\) I find that race, gender and grade are important determinants of network formation in schools. There is overwhelming evidence of homophily, i.e. students tend to interact and form social ties with similar people, other things being equal. These estimates control for the structure of the network. In addition, I find that homophily effects extend beyond direct links: students prefer an homogeneous racial composition of friends of friends.

This model provides useful guidance to policymakers who care about promoting policies that affect the structure of the network. I use the estimated model to predict how a change in the composition of the student population affects the structure of the network and wel-

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\(^6\)I use only the schools from the saturated sample. The sampling scheme of Add Health involved in-school interviews for all the students. A subsample of 20745 students was also interviewed at home, to collect detailed individual information. The saturated sample contains schools for which both interviews were administered to each student enrolled. Therefore this sample does not contain any missing information about individual controls. This is not the case for most schools in Add Health.
As an example, I consider a busing program that affects two schools in the sample, one with an enrolled population of 98% Whites and the other with 96% African Americans. I simulate alternative re-assignments of students across schools and then measure the average segregation and welfare in the new stationary equilibrium of the model.

I find that a desegregation program that equalizes the racial composition across schools is not welfare maximizing and may promote higher segregation within schools. Furthermore, a desegregation plan may have different effects on each school, increasing segregation in one while decreasing it in the other. I also compare the results of these policy experiments with results generated using a model with a simpler preference structure, where individuals care only about their direct links. The predictions of such model are quite different from the full structural model.

The paper provides both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on network formation. From the theoretical side, the model incorporates ingredients from both strategic and random network formation literature (Jackson, 2008). The link formation is sequential: each period only one agent is active and he updates only one link. At the beginning of the period, a random player is drawn from the population and he meets another agent according to a random meeting technology. Upon meeting the player has the opportunity to update his social tie to the agent. The implicit assumption is that meetings occur often and players have frequent opportunities to revise their strategies.

The agents’ preferences allow for a rich structure of indirect payoffs from link formation. Individuals care about the socioeconomic composition of their friends, friends of friends and feedback from those friends payoffs. Concretely, a player’s utility from linking to another individual depends on the socioeconomic attributes of the pair; additionally, players value the socioeconomic composition of friend of friends, and how befriending someone could affect their popularity among the other players. Finally, a link provides additional utility when it is reciprocated. When updating the link, the player receives a random shock to his preferences, which is unobserved by the econometrician. This shock captures unobservable factors that could affect link formation: for example, a student may be in a bad mood when he meets another individual, and this affects his linking strategy. The link is formed if and only if the social relationship provides positive utility. To preserve tractability, I assume that individuals do not take into account how their current linking strategy affects the shape of future networks: they follow a stochastic best-response dynamics à la Blume (1993).

Alternatively, the model could be used as a guide for the design of randomized experiments that modify students assignments.

It is possible to relax the assumption of myopic agents, but the computational burden becomes much more challenging. The simple characterization of equilibrium behavior, long run dynamics and the estimation
This assumption reduces the computational complexity and makes analysis of the network dynamics feasible.\footnote{Alternatively, it is possible to interpret this model as an equilibrium selection device, that selects one of the possible networks as the result of an evolutionary game.}

The model has two desirable features. First, there are two sources of heterogeneity. Each individual is endowed with a set of \textit{exogenous} attributes. Furthermore, the dynamics of network formation generates \textit{endogenous} heterogeneity: each individual has a different set of friends and different compositions of friends’ attributes. In equilibrium, two agents with the same exogenous attributes may exhibit very different linking strategies, due to their different endogenous positions in the network and the socioeconomic composition of their friends. Most models of strategic network formation incorporate the first level of heterogeneity but are unable to generate different equilibrium behavior, because the agents in these models only care about their direct links.\footnote{An exception is the model of \textit{De Marti and Zenou} (2009), where the cost of linking an individual also depends on the composition of friends of friends. While the structure of the preference is similar to mine, they present a static model and the link formation requires mutual agreement of the players. The consequence is that their model has multiple equilibria.}

Second, the network formation game can be characterized as a \textit{potential game}.\footnote{See \textit{Monderer and Shapley} (1996) for a description of games with a potential. \textit{Gilles and Sarangi} (2004) investigates a model of network formation with a potential function. Their model only considers the utility from direct links, while mine includes indirect links, mutual links and popularity.} All the players’ incentives in any state of the network are completely summarized by an aggregate function, \textit{the potential}, mapping networks and socioeconomic characteristics into potential levels. When an agent updates a link, the change in his utility is equal to the change in the aggregate potential. This simple characterization is key to making analysis of a network with many agents feasible because the potential summarizes the incentives of all players with a single number: there is no need to keep track of the choices and utility levels of all $n$ players. The existence of a potential allows me to characterize the stationary equilibrium in closed form. Assuming that preference shocks follow an extreme value distribution (i.i.d. over time and across agents), and that any pair of agents can meet with positive probability, I prove that the unique stationary equilibrium characterizes the probability of observing a specific network structure as an exponential function of the potential. This result provides the likelihood function underlying the estimation.

The second main contribution is the development of a flexible algorithm that reduces the computational burden for estimation.\footnote{\textit{Christakis et al.} (2010) propose an alternative model and estimation procedure. In their model myopic agents meet over time and must mutually agree to form a link. The meeting is treated as a latent variable and integrated out in estimation, using a MCMC algorithm that samples parameters from the posterior} The likelihood of this model is proportional
to a normalizing constant that cannot be evaluated or approximated with precision. A state-of-the-art supercomputer would take several years to evaluate the likelihood at a single parameter value. This feature prevents the use of traditional MCMC schemes, e.g. Metropolis-Hastings, that evaluate the likelihood at each iteration. To circumvent this problem, I propose a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that samples from the posterior distribution of the parameters without evaluating the likelihood. The algorithm belongs to the class of exchange algorithms, first proposed by Murray et al. (2006) to generate samples from posterior distributions with similar intractable likelihoods. I develop an approximate version of the algorithm that reduces the computational burden even further, allowing inference in high dimensional models.

The idea behind the sampler is as follows. At each iteration we perform a double Metropolis-Hastings step. First, we propose a new parameter vector as in the standard Metropolis-Hastings scheme; second, we draw a new network from the stationary equilibrium of the model at the proposed parameter, using a second Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. If the network generated by the latter simulation is similar to the network observed in the data, then the parameter is accepted with high probability; vice versa, if the simulated network is very different from the data, the probability of acceptance is lower. The similarity between networks is measured using likelihood ratios at the current and proposed parameters. The intuition is that if the observed and simulated networks are similar, the proposed parameter is very likely to generate the data as a draw from the stationary equilibrium.

I prove that the samples generated by my approximate algorithm converge to the correct posterior distribution. Therefore, sample averages computed using the algorithm’s output can be used to approximate posterior expectations and to make inference. In the empirical application I use an extension of the algorithm which makes use of parallel computing techniques and allows me to estimate the model using multiple network data. This is extremely important if the model is used to perform counterfactual policy experiments: using multiple networks allows to control for network fixed effects and additional network level characteristics that could affect the outcome of the implemented policy.

In the appendix, I provide extensions of the model and estimation strategy to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in individual quality and preferences. The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity and random coefficients makes the model more realistic, at the price of a substantial increase in computational costs. Furthermore, the estimation strategy is easily

while simulating meeting sequences.

I use arguments similar to Liang (2010)

While the evaluation of the likelihood is infeasible, it is always possible to evaluate likelihood ratios computed at the same parameter value but at different network configurations.
adapted to deal with missing links, through data augmentation techniques. This extension also comes with a substantial additional computational cost.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present the model’s details and show that it belongs to the class of potential games. Then, I provide a full characterization of the unique stationary equilibrium. Section 3 identifies the computational problem in estimation and proposes an approximate exchange algorithm for the estimation of the posterior distribution. I prove that the proposed algorithm converges to the correct posterior distribution. The empirical application is presented in Section 4, where I estimate preferences for interracial interaction in a sample of US high schools. I also study the impact of school desegregation programs on the structure of the school friendship network. Section 5 concludes. The proofs for the theoretical model results are in Appendix A, while the details of the estimation algorithm are contained in Appendix B. Several extensions of the model to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in individual quality and preferences, and missing links are shown in Appendix C.

2 A Model of Network Formation

2.1 Setup

Let \( \mathcal{I} = \{1,2,...,n\} \) be the set of agents, each identified by a vector of \( A \) (exogenous) attributes \( X_i = \{X_{i1},...,X_{iA}\} \), e.g. gender, wealth, age, location, etc. The attributes of the population are contained in the matrix \( X = \{X_1,X_2,...,X_n\} \) and \( \mathcal{X} \) denotes the set of all possible matrices \( X \). Time is discrete.

The social network is represented as a \( n \times n \) binary matrix \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), where \( \mathcal{G} \) is the set of all \( n \times n \) binary matrices. The generic element of matrix \( G \) is

\[
G_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if individual } i \text{ nominates individual } j \text{ as a friend} \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

and I follow the convention in the literature, assuming \( G_{ii} = 0 \), for any \( i \).

The network represented by \( G \) is directed: the existence of a link from \( i \) to \( j \) does not imply the existence of the link from \( j \) to \( i \), i.e. \( G_{ij} \neq G_{ji} \). This modeling choice reflects the structure of the Add Health data, where friendship nominations are not necessarily mutual. Some authors refer to this data as perceived networks.\(^{15}\)

Let the realization of the network at time \( t \) be denoted as \( g^t \) and the realization of the link between \( i \) and \( j \) at time \( t \) be \( g^t_{ij} \). The network including all the current links but \( g^t_{ij} \), i.e.

\(^{15}\)See Wasserman and Faust (1994) for references.
$g^t \backslash g^t_{ij}$, is denoted as $g^t_{-ij}$; while $g^t_{-i}$ denotes the network matrix excluding the $i$-th row (i.e. all the links of player $i$).

Preferences are defined over network realizations and population characteristics. I assume there is an utility function $U_i : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ for each $i$, mapping networks and individual characteristics into utility levels.

2.1.1 Network Formation Process

The process of link formation follows a stochastic best-response dynamics, as in Blume (1993), and generates a Markov chain of networks. The main ingredients of this process are random meetings and utility maximization. The implicit assumption is that individuals meet very frequently and have the opportunity to revise their links.

Meeting Technology. At the beginning of each period a player $i$ is randomly selected from the population, and he meets individual $j$, according to a matching technology. Formally, the meeting process is a stochastic sequence $m = \{m^t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$ with support $\mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{I}$. The realizations of the meeting process are ordered pairs $m^t = \{i,j\}$, indicating which agent $i$ should play and which link $g_{ij}$ can be updated at period $t$.\(^{16}\)

The probability that player $i$ is randomly chosen from the population and meets agent $j$ is defined as

$$\Pr (m^t = ij | g^{t-1}, X) = \rho (g^{t-1}, X_i, X_j)$$

where $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho (g, X_i, X_j) = 1$ for any $g \in \mathcal{G}$. The matching probability depends on the current network (e.g. the existence of a common friend between $i$ and $j$) and the characteristics of the pair. This structure includes matching technologies with a bias for same-type individuals as in Currarini et al. (2009). The simplest example of matching technology is an i.i.d. discrete uniform process with $\rho (g^{t-1}, X_i, X_j) = \frac{1}{n(n-1)}$. An example with bias for same-type agents is $\rho (g^{t-1}, X_i, X_j) \propto \exp [-d (X_i, X_j)]$, where $d (\cdot, \cdot)$ is a distance function.

Utility Maximization. Conditional on the meeting $m^t = ij$, player $i$ updates the link $g_{ij}$ to maximize his current utility, taking the existing network $g^t_{-ij}$ as given. I assume that the agents do not take into account the effect of their linking strategy on the future evolution of the network. The players have complete information, since they can observe the entire network and the individual attributes of all agents. Before updating his link to $j$, individual

\(^{16}\)Several models incorporate a matching technology in the network formation process. Jackson and Watts (2002) assume individuals meet randomly according to a discrete uniform distribution. Currarini et al. (2009) introduce a matching process that is biased towards individuals of the same type, similar to the one modeled here.
\( i \) receives an idiosyncratic shock \( \varepsilon \sim F(\varepsilon) \) to his preferences that the econometrician cannot observe. This shock models unobservables that could influence the utility of an additional link, e.g. mood, gossips, fights, etc. Player \( i \) links agent \( j \) at time \( t \) if and only if it is a best response to the current network configuration, i.e. \( g^t_{ij} = 1 \) if and only if

\[
U_i (g^t_{ij} = 1, g^{t-1}_{-ij}, X) + \varepsilon_{1t} \geq U_i (g^t_{ij} = 0, g^{t-1}_{-ij}, X) + \varepsilon_{0t}.
\]

I assume that when the equality holds, the agent plays the status quo.\(^\text{17}\)

The network formation process generates a sequence \([g^0, g^1, ..., g^t]\) of networks. In each period only one element of the random matrix \( G \) is updated, conditioning on the existing network. Therefore the sequence is a Markov chain, with transition probabilities determined by the meeting process and agents’ linking choices.\(^\text{18}\)

### 2.1.2 Preferences

The preferences are defined over networks and individual characteristics. The utility of player \( i \) from a network \( g \) and population attributes \( X = (X_1, ..., X_n) \) is given by

\[
U_i (g, X) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} u_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} g_{ji} m_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{jk} v_{ik} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ki} w_{kj}
\]

where \( u_{ij} \equiv u(X_i, X_j) \), \( m_{ij} \equiv m(X_i, X_j) \), \( v_{ij} \equiv v(X_i, X_j) \) and \( w_{ij} \equiv w(X_i, X_j) \) are (bounded) real-valued functions of the attributes. The utility of the network is the sum of the net benefits received from each link. The total benefit from an additional link has four components.

When a player creates a link to another individual, he receives a direct net benefit \( u_{ij} \). The direct utility includes both costs and benefits and it may possibly be negative: when only homophily enters payoffs of direct links, the net utility \( u_{ij} \) is positive if \( i \) and \( j \) belong to the same group, while it is negative when they are of different types. This is illustrated

\(^{17}\)This assumption does not affect the main result and is relevant only when the distribution of the preference shocks is discrete.

\(^{18}\)The derivation of the transition matrix is straightforward. The set of all possible states corresponds to the set of all possible binary \( n \times n \) matrices \( \mathcal{G} \); the probability of transition from a network \( g^t = g \) to next period network \( g^{t+1} = (g'_{ij}, g_{-ij}) \) is

\[
\rho (g, X_i, X_j) \Pr \left[ U_i (g'_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) + \varepsilon (g'_{ij}) \geq U_i (g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) + \varepsilon (g_{ij}) \right]
\]

The transition probability is zero if the networks \( g \) and \( g' \) differ by more than one element.
Figure 1: Components of the utility function

A. Direct friends

B. Mutual friends

C. Friends of friends

D. Popularity

The network contains $n = 8$ agents, belonging to two groups: blue and yellow. All the panels show a situation in which player 4 decides whether to form a link to individual 5 (the dashed arrow from 4 to 5). Agent 4 receives different direct utility when he links a blue (Panel A, left) or a yellow (Panel A, right) individual. Agent 4’s utility from an additional link is different if the link is unilateral (Panel B, left) or reciprocated (Panel B, right). Furthermore, agent 4’s utility from friends of friends varies with their socioeconomic composition: 3 blue individuals (Panel C, left) provide different utility than 2 blue and 1 yellow agents (Panel C, right). Finally, agent 4 values how his new link affects his popularity, since he creates a new indirect friendship for those who already have a link to him (agents 1, 2, and 3). The utility of a link to agent 5 (which is yellow) when agents 1, 2, and 3 are all blue (Panel D, left) is different than when agent 2 is yellow and 1 and 2 are blue (Panel D, right).

in Panel A of Figure 1 with a simple network of 8 agents. Each agent can belong to either the blue group or the yellow group. The link that agent 4 forms to individual 5 provides
different direct utility in the two networks, since the identity of 5 is different: blue for the left network and yellow for the right one. In many models this component is parameterized as $u_{ij} = b_{ij} - c_{ij}$, where $b_{ij}$ indicates the (gross) benefit and $c_{ij}$ the cost of forming the additional link $g_{ij}$. I use the notation $u_{ij}$, since it does not require assumptions on the cost function.

The players receive additional utility $m_{ij}$ if the link is mutual; friendship is valued differently if the other agent reciprocates. An agent may perceive another individual as a friend, but that person may not perceive the relationship in the same way. Panel B of Figure 1 isolates this component: a link from agent 4 to agent 5 has a different value if agent 5 reciprocates (right network).

The players value the composition of friends of friends. When $i$ is deciding whether to befriend $j$, she observes $j$’s friends and their socioeconomic characteristics. Each of $j$’s friend provides additional utility $v(X_i, X_k)$ to $i$. In this model, an agent who has the opportunity to form an additional link, values a white student with three Hispanic friends as a different good than a white student with two white friends and one African American friend. In other words, individuals value both *exogenous* heterogeneity and *endogenous* heterogeneity: the former is determined by the socioeconomic characteristics of the agents, while the latter arises endogenously with the process of network formation. I assume that only friends of friends are valuable and they are perfect substitutes: individuals do not receive utility from two-links-away friends. In Panel C of Figure 1, from the perspective of agent 4, agent 5 in the left network is a different good than agent 5 in the right network, since the composition of his friends is different.

The fourth component corresponds to a *popularity effect*. Consider Panel D in Figure 1. When agent 4 forms a link to agent 5, he automatically creates an indirect link for agents 1, 2 and 3. Thus agent 4 generates an externality. For example, suppose there is homophily in indirect links. Then in the left network the externality is negative for all three agents (1, 2 and 3); and in the right network it is negative for 1 and 3, but positive for 2. Therefore, in the left network the popularity of 4 goes down, while in the right network the fall in popularity is less pronounced.

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19 A similar assumption is used in De Marti and Zenou (2009) where the agents’ cost of linking depend on the racial composition of friends of friends. Their model is an extension of the connection model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and the links are formed with mutual consent. The corresponding network is undirected.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis

I impose an additional assumption on the functional forms of the utility functions. The assumption is not too strong, but it provides important identification restrictions. I assume that the utility $m_{ij}$ obtained from mutual links is symmetric and that the utility of an indirect link $v_{ij}$ has the same functional form as the utility from the popularity effect $w_{ij}$.

**ASSUMPTION 1 (Preferences)** The preferences satisfy the following restrictions

\[
\begin{align*}
  m(X_i, X_j) &= m(X_j, X_i) \quad \text{for all } i, j \in I \\
  w(X_k, X_j) &= v(X_k, X_j) \quad \text{for all } k, j \in I
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore the utility function is

\[
U_i(g, X) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij}u_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij}g_jm_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i, j}^{n} g_{jk}v_{ik} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i, j}^{n} g_{ki}v_{kj}
\]

(5)

The symmetry in $m_{ij}$ does not imply that a mutual link between $i$ and $j$ gives both the same utility. Indeed if $i$ and $j$ have a mutual link, they receive the same common utility component ($m_{ij}$) but they may perceive that particular friendship in a different way, as long as the utility from direct or indirect links are different for $i$ and $j$. As a result, two individuals with the same exogenous characteristics $X_i = X_j$ (say two males, whites, enrolled in eleventh grade) who form a mutual link receive the same $u_{ij}$ and $m_{ij}$, but they may have different utilities from that additional link because of the composition of their friends of friends and their popularity. Therefore, this part of the assumption helps in identifying the utility from indirect links and popularity.

The second restriction is more technical. When $i$ forms a link to $j$, $i$ creates an externality for all $k$’s who have linked her: any such $k$ now has an additional indirect friend, i.e. $j$, who agent $k$ values by an amount $v(X_k, X_j)$. When $w(X_k, X_j) = v(X_k, X_j)$, an individual $i$ values his popularity effect as much as $k$ values the indirect link to $j$, i.e., $i$ internalizes the externality he creates.

Assumption 1 is the main ingredient that guarantees a closed form solution for the stationary equilibrium of the model. Without this assumption, the model would still have a unique stationary equilibrium, however it would be impossible to characterize the likelihood function in closed form.\(^{20}\) The first part of the assumption is a normalization of the utility function that allows identification for the utility of indirect links and popularity. The second

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\(^{20}\)Estimation of such a model could be performed using Approximate Bayesian Computations (see Marjoram et al. (2003) for example), but the computational burden is even more challenging.
part of the assumption is an identification restriction, that guarantees the model’s coherency in the sense of Tamer (2003). In simple words, this part of the assumption guarantees that the system of conditional linking probabilities implied by the model generates a proper joint distribution of the network matrix.\footnote{Similar restrictions are also encountered in spatial econometrics models (Besag, 1974) and in the literature on qualitative response models (Heckman, 1978; Amemiya, 1981)}

The assumption delivers a very simple characterization of the stationary equilibrium. The following proposition highlights a crucial result of this paper.

**PROPOSITION 1 (Potential Function)**

Under Assumption 1, the deterministic component of the incentives of any player in any state of the network are summarized by a potential function, $Q : \mathcal{G} \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$Q(g, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij}u_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j>i}^{n} g_{ij}g_{ji}m_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{j \neq i}^{n} g_{ij}g_{jk}v_{ik},$$

(6)

and the network formation game is a Potential Game.

**Proof.** See Appendix A

The intuition for the result is simple. Under the restrictions of Assumption 1, for any player $i$ and any link $g_{ij}$ we have

$$Q(g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) - Q(1 - g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) = U_i(g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) - U_i(1 - g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X)$$

Consider two networks, $g = (g_{ij}, g_{-ij})$ and $g' = (1 - g_{ij}, g_{-ij})$, that differ only with respect to one link, $g_{ij}$, chosen by individual $i$: the difference in utility that agent $i$ receives from the two networks, $U_i(g, X) - U_i(g', X)$, is exactly equal to the difference of the potential function evaluated at the two networks, $Q(g, X) - Q(g', X)$. That is, the potential is an aggregate function that summarizes both the state of the network and the deterministic incentives of the players in each state.

Characterizing the network formation as a potential game facilitates analysis. In order to compute the equilibria of the model, there is no need to keep track of each player’s behavior: the potential function contains all the relevant information. This property is key for the analysis of networks with many players: the usual check for existence of profitable deviations from the Nash equilibrium can be performed using the potential, instead of checking each player’s possible deviation in sequence. The computation of all profitable deviations for each player involves $n(n - 1)2^{n(n-1)}$ operations: each player has $n - 1$ possible deviations, there
are $n$ players and a total of $2^{n(n-1)}$ possible network configurations.  As it is shown below (Proposition 2), when the game is a potential game, the computation of all Nash equilibria is equivalent to finding the local maxima of the potential function. This corresponds to evaluating the potential function for all the $2^{n(n-1)}$ possible network structures. The latter task involves fewer operations by a factor of $n(n-1)$, thus decreasing the computational burden.

It should be emphasized that the potential $Q(g,X)$ is not equivalent to the welfare function $W(g,X)$, that describes the total utility of all agents in the network,

$$W(g,X) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i(g,X)$$

$$= Q(g,X) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j>i}^{n} g_{ij} g_{ji} m_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ij} g_{ki} v_{kj}$$

To analyze the long run behavior of the model, I impose more structure on the meeting technology.\footnote{Christakis et al. (2010) assume that individuals can meet only once and their link remains in place forever. This assumption is convenient when estimating a large network, but it does not allow the characterization of the stationary equilibrium.}

**ASSUMPTION 2 (Meeting Process)** Any meeting is possible, i.e., for any $ij \in \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{I}$

$$\rho(g^{t-1},X_i,X_j) > 0$$ (7)

The meeting process is such that any player can be chosen and any pair of agents can meet. This assumption guarantees that any equilibrium network can be reached with positive probability. For example, a discrete uniform distribution satisfies this assumption.

It is helpful to consider a special case of the model, in which there are no preference shocks: the characterization of equilibria and long run behavior for such model provides intuition about the dynamic properties of the full structural model. Let $\mathcal{N}(g)$ be the set of networks that differ from $g$ by only one element of the matrix, i.e.

$$\mathcal{N}(g) \equiv \{ g' : g' = (g'_{ij}, g_{-ij}), \text{ for all } g'_{ij} \neq g_{ij}, \text{ for all } i,j \in \mathcal{I} \}. \quad (8)$$

A Nash network is defined as a network in which any player has no profitable deviations from his current linking strategy, when randomly selected from the population. The following results characterize the set of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the long run behavior of the model with no shocks.
PROPOSITION 2 (Model without Shocks: Equilibria and Long Run)
Consider the model without idiosyncratic preference shocks. Under Assumptions 1 and 2:

1. There exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium network

2. The set \( \mathcal{NE}(G, X, U) \) of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the network formation game is completely characterized by the local maxima of the potential function.

\[
\mathcal{NE}(G, X, U) = \left\{ g^* : g^* = \arg \max_{g \in \mathcal{N}(g^*)} Q(g, X) \right\}
\]  

(9)

3. Any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is an absorbing state.

4. As \( t \to \infty \), the network converges to one of the Nash networks with probability 1.

Proof. In Appendix A ■

Suppose that the current network is a Nash network. As a consequence, if a player deviates from the current linking strategy, he receives less utility.\(^{23}\) Since the change in utility for any agent is equivalent to the change in potential, any deviation from the Nash network must decrease the potential. It follows that the Nash network must be a local maximizer of the potential function over the set of networks that differ from the current network for at most one link.

Furthermore, the network must converge to one of the Nash Equilibria in the long run, independently of the initial network. Suppose a player is drawn from the meeting process. Such agent will play a best response to the current network configuration. Therefore, his utility cannot decrease. This holds for any player and any period. It follows that the potential is nondecreasing over time. Since there is a finite number of possible networks, in the long run, the sequence of networks must reach a local maximum of the potential, i.e., a Nash equilibrium.

With the intuition from the simpler model in mind, we can now analyze the full structural model with preference shocks. In the full model there is a high probability of hitting a Nash network. However, the preference shocks allow the chain to escape from such networks: this makes the model ergodic and eliminates absorbing states.

I make the following parametric assumption on the shocks, that allows me to characterize the stationary distribution and transition probabilities.

\(^{23}\)When the utility from the equilibrium and the deviation is the same, the agent plays the status quo, i.e., the Nash strategy.
ASSUMPTION 3 (Idiosyncratic Shocks) The shock follows a Type I extreme value distribution, i.i.d. among links and across time.

The probability of a link between $i$ and $j$, given a meeting $m^t = ij$ and previous period network configuration $g^{t-1}$ is thus given by

$$
\Pr\left(g^t_{ij} = 1 \mid g^{t-1}_{-ij}, X\right) = \Pr\left[\varepsilon_0 - \varepsilon_{1t} \leq U_i (1, g^{t-1}_{-ij}, X) - U_i (0, g^{t-1}_{-ij}, X)\right]
$$

$$
= \frac{\exp\left[u_{ij} + g^{t-1}_{ji} m_{ij} + \sum_{k \neq i,j} g^{t-1}_{jk} v_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i,j} g^{t-1}_{ki} v_{kj}\right]}{1 + \exp\left[u_{ij} + g^{t-1}_{ji} m_{ij} + \sum_{k \neq i,j} g^{t-1}_{jk} v_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i,j} g^{t-1}_{ki} v_{kj}\right]}
$$

Under Assumptions 1-3, the network evolves as a Markov chain with transition probabilities given by the conditional choice probabilities (11) and the probability law of the meeting process $m^t$.

One can show that the sequence $[g^0, g^1, ..., g^t]$ is:

1. irreducible, i.e. every state of the network can be reached with positive probability in a finite number of steps

2. aperiodic, i.e. the chain does not get trapped in cycles, because the probability of moving from a state to another is always positive under the extreme value assumption

Intuitively, since the meeting probability $\Pr(m^t = ij) > 0$ for all $ij$, there is always a positive probability of reaching a new network in which the link $g_{ij}$ can be updated. The logistic shock assumption implies that there is always a positive probability of switching to another state of the network, thus eliminating absorbing states.

THEOREM 1 (Uniqueness and Characterization of Stationary Equilibrium)
Consider the network formation game with idiosyncratic shocks, under Assumptions 1-3.

1. There exists a unique stationary distribution $\pi(g, X)$, i.e.,

$$
\lim_{t \to \infty} P(G^t = g \mid G^0 = g^0, X) = \pi(g, X).
$$

2. If the meeting probability of $i$ and $j$ does not depend on the existence of a link between them, i.e.,

$$
\rho(g^{t-1}, X_i, X_j) = \rho(g^{-1}_{-ij}, X_i, X_j),
$$

for any $i, j \in I$. Then the stationary distribution $\pi(g, X)$ is

$$
\pi(g, X) = \frac{\exp\left[Q(g, X)\right]}{\sum_{\omega \in \mathcal{G}} \exp\left[Q(\omega, X)\right]},
$$

where $Q(g, X)$ is the potential function (6).

Proof. In Appendix A ■

The first part of the proposition follows directly from the irreducibility and aperiodicity of the Markov process generated by the network formation game. The uniqueness of the stationary distribution is crucial in estimation, since one does not need to worry about multiple equilibria. Furthermore, the stationary equilibrium characterizes the likelihood of observing a specific network configuration in the data. As a consequence, I can estimate the structural parameters from observations of only one network at a specific point in time, under the assumption that the observed network is drawn from the stationary equilibrium.

The second part of the proposition provides a closed-form solution for the stationary distribution. The latter can be interpreted as the probability of observing a specific network structure, when the network is observed in the long run. In the long run, the system of interacting agents will visit more often those states/networks that have high potential, which correspond to the Nash equilibria described in Proposition 2. Therefore a high proportion of the possible networks generated by the network formation game, will correspond to Nash networks.

The stationary distribution \( \pi (g, X) \) includes a normalizing constant

\[
c (G, X) \equiv \sum_{\omega \in G} \exp [Q (\omega, X)]
\]

that guarantees that (14) is a proper probability distribution. Unfortunately, this normalizing constant greatly complicates estimation, since it cannot be evaluated exactly or approximated with precision. How this is circumvented is explained in the next section.

3 Estimation Strategy

3.1 Computational Problem

To estimate the model, I assume that the utility functions depend on a vector of parameters \( \theta = (\theta_u, \theta_m, \theta_v) \):

\[
u_{ij} (\theta_u) = u (X_i, X_j, \theta_u)
\]

\[
m_{ij} (\theta_m) = m (X_i, X_j, \theta_m)
\]

\[
v_{ij} (\theta_v) = v (X_i, X_j, \theta_v)
\]

The goal is to recover the parameters’ posterior distribution, given the data, the model and the prior. Let \( p (\theta) \) be the prior distribution. Given the likelihood function \( \pi (g, X, \theta) \) of the
observed data \((g, X)\), the posterior distribution of \(\theta\) can be written as

\[
p(\theta | g, X) = \frac{\pi(g, X, \theta) p(\theta)}{\int_\Theta \pi(g, X, \theta) p(\theta) d\theta}.
\]

Intuitively, the posterior is the distribution of the parameters that are most likely to generate the data \(g\), given the model \(\pi(g, X, \theta)\) and the prior \(p(\theta)\).

Estimation of the posterior faces two computational challenges. First, the posterior depends on the normalizing integral \(\int_\Theta \pi(g, X, \theta) p(\theta) d\theta\). This problem is common to any Bayesian analysis, and is often solved using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm that avoids direct computation of the integral. This algorithm generates a Markov chain of parameters \(\{\theta_0, \theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots\}\) whose unique invariant distribution is the posterior (16). The empirical distribution of the chain is used as estimate of the posterior. A Weak Law of Large Numbers guarantees that sample averages computed using the sequence generated by the chain, converge to the expectation under the posterior distribution.

At each iteration \(s\), with current parameter \(\theta_s = \theta\), a new parameter vector \(\theta'\) is proposed from a distribution \(q_\theta(\cdot | \theta)\). At iteration \(t + 1\) the new parameter \(\theta_{s+1}\) is updated according to

\[
\theta_{s+1} = \begin{cases} 
\theta' & \text{with prob. } \alpha(\theta, \theta') \\
\theta & \text{with prob. } 1 - \alpha(\theta, \theta')
\end{cases}
\]

(17)

where \(\alpha(\theta, \theta')\) is computed as

\[
\alpha(\theta, \theta') = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{p(\theta' | g, X) q_\theta(\theta | \theta')}{p(\theta | g, X) q_\theta(\theta' | \theta)} \right\}
\]

(18)

The appealing feature of this scheme is that one does not need to evaluate the integral to compute \(\alpha(\theta, \theta')\), because the ratio of the posteriors is

\[
p(\theta' | g, X) / p(\theta | g, X) = \frac{\pi(g, X, \theta') p(\theta')}{\pi(g, X, \theta) p(\theta)}.
\]

However, the naive version of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm cannot be used for the model formulated above. The likelihood function \(\pi(g, X, \theta)\) is known up to a normalizing constant that cannot be computed in practice. The acceptance probability in (18) can be rewritten to make the likelihood contribution explicit

\[
\alpha(\theta, \theta') = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta')]}{c(G, X, \theta)} p(\theta') q_\theta(\theta | \theta') \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c(G, X, \theta)} p(\theta) q_\theta(\theta' | \theta) \right\}
\]

\[
= \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta')]}{c(G, X, \theta)} p(\theta') q_\theta(\theta | \theta') \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c(G, X, \theta)} p(\theta) q_\theta(\theta' | \theta) \right\}
\]

(18)

The Metropolis-Hastings acceptance \(\alpha(\theta, \theta')\) depends on the ratio \(c(G, X, \theta) / c(G, X, \theta')\), whose exact evaluation is computationally infeasible even for very small networks. To
be concrete, consider a small network with \( n = 10 \) agents. From (15) we know that 
\[ c(G, X, \theta) = \sum_{\omega \in G} \exp [Q(\omega, X, \theta)]. \]
To compute the constant at the current parameter \( \theta \) we would need to evaluate the potential function for all \( 2^{90} \approx 10^{27} \) possible networks with 10 agents and compute their sum. This task would take a very long time even for a state-of-the-art supercomputer. In general with a network containing \( n \) players, we have to sum over \( 2^{n(n-1)} \) possible network configurations.\(^{24}\)

### 3.2 Estimation Algorithm

To solve the estimation problem, I develop a variation of the exchange algorithm, first developed by Murray et al. (2006). This algorithm uses a double Metropolis-Hastings step to avoid the computation of the normalizing constant \( c(G, X, \theta) \) in the likelihood. This improvement comes with a cost: the algorithm may produce MCMC chains that have very poor mixing properties (Caimo and Friel, 2010) and high autocorrelation. I partially correct for this problem by carefully calibrating the proposal distribution.\(^{25}\)

While several authors have proposed similar algorithms in the related literature on Exponential Random Graphs Models (ERGM),\(^{26}\) the models estimated with this methodology typically have very few parameters and use data from very small networks. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate a high-dimensional model using data from multiple networks.

In this section I describe the algorithm for a single network, while in the appendix I provide the extension for multiple independent networks.\(^{27}\) This is especially important for policy: schools may have unobserved differences that impact the network formation process and using multiple networks may partially correct for that.

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\(^{24}\)A supercomputer that can compute \( 10^{12} \) potential functions in 1 second would take almost 40 million years to compute the constant once for a network with \( n = 10 \) players. The schools used in the empirical section have between 20 and 159 enrolled students. This translates into a minimum of \( 2^{380} \) and a maximum of \( 2^{25122} \) possible network configurations.

\(^{25}\)In this paper I use a random walk proposal. Alternatively one could update the parameters in blocks or use recent random block techniques as in Chib and Ramamurthy (2009) to improve convergence and mixing.

\(^{26}\)Caimo and Friel (2010) use the exchange algorithm to estimate ERGM. They improve the mixing of the sampler using the snooker algorithm. Koskinen (2008) proposes the Linked Importance Sampler Auxiliary variable (LISA) algorithm, which uses importance sampling to provide an estimate of the acceptance probability. Another variation of the algorithm is used in Liang (2010).

\(^{27}\)When the data consist of several independent school networks, I use a parallel version of the algorithm that stores each network in a different processor. Each processor runs the simulations independently and the final results are summarized in the master processor, that updates the parameters for next iteration. Details in Appendix.
The idea of the algorithm is to sample from an augmented distribution using an auxiliary variable. At each iteration, the algorithm proposes a new parameter vector $\theta'$, drawn from a suitable proposal distribution $q_0(\theta'|\theta)$; in the second step, it samples a network $g'$ (the auxiliary variable) from the likelihood $\pi(g', X, \theta')$; finally, the proposed parameter is accepted with a probability $\alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta')$, such that the Markov chain of parameters generated by these update rules, has the posterior (16) as unique invariant distribution.

I first describe the algorithm used to sample a network from the stationary distribution of the model; then I provide the full algorithm for estimation of the posterior.

3.2.1 Network Simulations

To use the exchange algorithm, I need to draw random samples from the stationary distribution of the network formation model. Direct simulation is not possible because the normalizing constant $c(G, X, \theta)$ is computationally infeasible, for the reasons explained above. Therefore I rely on Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods.

The algorithm used in this paper is similar to the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm proposed in Snijders (2002). For a fixed parameter value $\theta$, the algorithm simulates a Markov chain of networks whose unique invariant distribution is (14). As the number of iterations $R$ becomes large, the simulated networks are (approximate) samples from the stationary distribution of the model evaluated at parameter $\theta$.

**ALGORITHM 1** Fix a parameter value $\theta$. At iteration $r$, with current network $g_r$

1. Propose a network $g'$ from a proposal distribution

$$g' \sim q_g(g'|g_r)$$

2. Update the network according to

$$g_{r+1} = \begin{cases} g' & \text{with prob. } \alpha_{mh}(g_r, g') \\ g_r & \text{with prob. } 1 - \alpha_{mh}(g_r, g') \end{cases}$$

where

$$\alpha_{mh}(g_r, g') = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \theta)] q_g(g_r|g')}{\exp [Q(g_r, X, \theta)] q_g(g'|g_r)} \right\}$$

---

28 I also experimented with the Simulated Tempering algorithm proposed in Mele (2010). The latter is extremely useful when the stationary distribution of the network formation model has more than one mode. It also improves the mixing of the chain. However, it does so by increasing the time needed to collect a sample. In this context, a set of experiments with artificial data revealed virtually no difference between the Simulated Tempering results and the simpler Metropolis-Hastings updates, so I use the latter in this paper.
At each iteration a random network \( g' \) is proposed, and the update is accepted with probability \( \alpha_{mh}(g_r, g') \). The main advantage of this simulation strategy is that the acceptance ratio (21) does not contain the normalizing constant \( c(G, X, \theta) \) of the stationary distribution. Each quantity in the acceptance ratio can be computed exactly.

The Metropolis-Hastings structure of the algorithm guarantees that the sampled networks are drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model.

**PROPOSITION 3** *The updates in ALGORITHM 1 produce a Markov Chain of networks.*

1. The unique invariant distribution of ALGORITHM 1 is the stationary equilibrium of the model at parameter \( \theta \)

\[
\lim_{r \to \infty} \Pr (G_r = g | G_0 = g_0, X, \theta) = \pi (g, X, \theta) \tag{22}
\]

2. The Markov Chain generated by ALGORITHM 1 is uniformly ergodic, i.e. there exist constants \( B > 0 \) and \( \kappa \in (0, 1) \) such that

\[
\max_{g_0 \in G} \left\| \mathcal{P}_\theta^{(r)} (\cdot | g_0) - \pi (\cdot, X, \theta) \right\|_{TV} \leq B \kappa^r \tag{23}
\]

where \( \mathcal{P}_\theta^{(r)} (g | g_0) \) is the \( r \)-th step transition probability of the algorithm, starting at network \( g_0 \) and using parameter \( \theta \); and \( \| \cdot \|_{TV} \) is the total variation distance.

3. For any initial network \( g_0 \), the rate of convergence can be bounded as

\[
2 \sup_{g \in G} \left| \pi (g, \theta) - \mathcal{P}_\theta^{(r)} (g | g_0) \right| \leq \sqrt{\frac{1 - \pi (g_0, \theta)}{\pi (g_0, \theta)}} \lambda_* (\theta)^r \tag{24}
\]

where \( \lambda_* (\theta) = \max \{ \lambda_2 (\theta) , | \lambda_{2n(n-1)} (\theta) | \} \) is the second highest eigenvalue of ALGORITHM 1’s transition matrix.

**Proof.** See Appendix B ■

The first part of the proposition confirms that the algorithm converges to the stationary equilibrium of the model. Therefore, one can generate samples from the stationary equilibrium of the model using a sufficiently long chain generated by ALGORITHM 1. The second part establishes uniform convergence to the stationary distribution and the last statement of the proposition bounds the rate of convergence. Formula (24) is a classical result on Markov chain convergence (see Diaconis and Stroock (1991) or Meyn and Tweedie (2009)). For certain regions of the parameter space, the convergence would be fast, while for other parameter regions the rate of convergence could be extremely slow. Recent work on similar
algorithms for the simulation of exponential random graphs, have shown that in several cases the convergence rates are so slow that the simulation is infeasible. Diaconis and Chatterjee (2011) and Bhamidi et al. (forthcoming) show that for the simplest Erdos-Renyi random graph, the bound to the convergence rate scales up with \( m \log(m) \), where \( m \) is the total number of states. In our setting, \( m = 2^{n(n-1)} \). However, the bounds in these papers are for any parameter \( \theta \) and for any initial network \( g_0 \). This implies that the researcher can improve convergence through a careful choice of the initial network and proposal distributions, as indicated in (24).

In the empirical implementation of the algorithm, I use several alternative proposals \( q_g(\cdot|\cdot) \). First, a move that updates only one link per iteration, proposing to swap the link value. At each iteration a random pair of agents \((i,j)\) is selected from a discrete uniform distribution, and it is proposed to swap the value of the link \( g_{ij} \) to \( 1 - g_{ij} \). Second, to improve convergence, I allow the sampler to propose bigger moves: with a small probability \( p_{inv} \), the sampler proposes to invert the network matrix, i.e. \( g' = 1 - g \), and the proposal is accepted with probability \( \alpha_{mh}(g,g') \).\(^{29}\) These proposals directly modify the transition matrix of ALGORITHM 1, decreasing the value of the second highest eigenvalue.

The choice of the initial network is quite trivial in this model, and it is given by the observed network \( g \). There are two reasons for this choice. First, in the high density region of the posterior the observed network \( g \) must have high probability according to the model. This decreases \( \sqrt{\frac{1 - \pi(g, \theta)}{\pi(g_0, \theta)}} \). Second, the result in Lemma 1 in Appendix B shows that this choice guarantees faster convergence of the approximate posterior simulation algorithm to the correct posterior.

### 3.2.2 Posterior Simulation

I propose a modified version of the exchange algorithm developed by Murray et al. (2006) to sample from distributions with intractable constants. In the original algorithm, one needs to draw exact samples from the stationary equilibrium of the model. However, this would require an enormous number of steps using the network simulation algorithm. My strategy is instead to exploit the result in Lemma 1 (in Appendix B) to decrease the number of simulations needed to collect an approximate sample from the stationary equilibrium. The Lemma essentially implies that my approximate algorithm and the exact algorithm have the same probability of accepting the proposed parameter.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\)This move is suggested in Geyer (1992) and Snijders (2002). Snijders (2002) argues that this is particularly useful in case of a bimodal distribution.

\(^{30}\)The details require a careful use of the detailed balance condition for the network simulation model. See Appendix B.
The samples from the posterior distribution are generated using the following steps.

**ALGORITHM 2 (APPROXIMATE EXCHANGE ALGORITHM)**

Fix the number of simulations $R$. At each iteration $t$, with current parameter $\theta_t = \theta$ and network data $g$:

1. Propose a new parameter $\theta'$ from a distribution $q_{\theta}(\cdot|\theta)$,

$$\theta' \sim q_{\theta}(\cdot|\theta). \quad (25)$$

2. Start **ALGORITHM 1** at the observed network $g$, iterating for $R$ steps using parameter $\theta'$ and collect the last simulated network $g'$

$$g' \sim P^{(R)}_{\theta'}(g'|g). \quad (26)$$

3. Update the parameter according to

$$\theta_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
\theta' & \text{with prob. } \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) \\
\theta & \text{with prob. } 1 - \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g)
\end{cases}$$

where

$$\alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp \left[ Q(g', X, \theta) \right] p(\theta') q_{\theta}(\theta'|\theta') \exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta') \right]}{\exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta) \right] p(\theta) q_{\theta}(\theta'|\theta) \exp \left[ Q(g', X, \theta') \right]} \right\}. \quad (27)$$

The appeal of this algorithm is that all quantities in the acceptance ratio (27) can be evaluated: there are no integrals or normalizing constants to compute. I provide the algorithm details, and the relative proofs of convergence to the posterior and some evidence on mixing in Appendix B. The algorithm used to estimate the model using multiple school networks on parallel processors is an extension of ALGORITHM 2. I also present it in Appendix B. Here I explain intuitively why the sampler works, with the help of Figure 2.

For ease of exposition, suppose that the prior is relatively flat, so that $p(\theta)/p(\theta') \simeq 1$. Suppose we start the sampler from a parameter $\theta$ that has high posterior probability, given the data $g$. That is, there is good agreement between the data and the parameter, so it is likely that the data are generated from a model with parameter $\theta$. This is displayed on the left panel of Figure 2. Now, suppose we propose a parameter $\theta'$ that belongs to a low probability region of the posterior. This means that there is a low probability that the observed network $g$ is generated by parameter $\theta'$. As a consequence the ratio

$$\frac{p(\theta'|g, X)}{p(\theta|g, X)} \simeq \frac{\pi(g, X, \theta')}{\pi(g, X, \theta)}$$
Figure 2: The Exchange Algorithm

A. Posterior Distribution

The graph on the left is the posterior distribution, given the data. The graph on the right represents two stationary equilibria of the model, one at parameter $\theta$ (blue) and one at parameter $\theta'$ (red). The iteration $t$ starts with parameter $\theta$. It is proposed to update the parameter using proposal $\theta'$. The algorithm starts sampling networks from the stationary distribution at parameter $\theta'$ (red) and quickly moves from $g$ to $g'$. The probability of accepting the proposed parameter $\theta'$ is proportional to the ratio $\frac{\pi(g',X,\theta')}{\pi(g,X,\theta')}$, which is small as indicated in the graph. In summary, a move from the high density region of the posterior ($\theta$) to a low density region ($\theta'$) is likely to be rejected. For the same reasoning a move from $\theta'$ to $\theta$ is very likely to be accepted. Therefore the algorithm produces samples from the correct posterior distribution.

would be very small, as indicated in the right panel of Figure 2. Let’s start the network simulations using parameter $\theta'$. The sequence of simulated networks will start approaching the new stationary distribution $\pi(\cdot, X, \theta')$, moving away from the stationary distribution $\pi(\cdot, X, \theta)$. This is indicated in Figure 2 with a simulation of 2 steps: starting from $g$ we obtain two networks, $g^1$ and $g'$. Network $g'$ is closer to a high probability region of $\pi(\cdot, X, \theta')$ than to a high probability region of $\pi(\cdot, X, \theta)$, as long as the algorithm was run for a sufficiently large number of steps $R$. It also follows that the ratio

$$\frac{\pi(g',X,\theta)}{\pi(g',X,\theta')}$$

is small. Notice that

$$\frac{\pi(g',X,\theta)}{\pi(g',X,\theta')} \frac{\pi(g,X,\theta')}{\pi(g,X,\theta)} = \frac{\exp[Q(g',X,\theta)] \exp[Q(g,X,\theta')]}{\exp[Q(g',X,\theta')] \exp[Q(g,X,\theta)]} \frac{c(G, X, \theta')}{c(G, X, \theta)}$$

where $G$ is the graph and $X$ and $\theta$ are the data and parameter respectively.
This ratio is contained in (27). As a consequence the acceptance ratio of the exchange algorithm is low and the proposed parameter $\theta'$ is very likely to be rejected. Let’s repeat the reasoning while starting the sampler at $\theta'$ and proposing an update $\theta$: this proposal is very likely to be accepted by the same intuitive argument.

In summary, the sampler is likely to accept proposals that move towards high density regions of the posterior, but it is likely to reject proposals that move towards low density regions of the posterior. Therefore, it produces samples of parameters that closely resemble draws from the posterior distribution. The formal statement about ergodicity is contained in the following theorem.

**THEOREM 2** (Ergodicity of the Approximate Exchange Algorithm). The approximate exchange algorithm is ergodic, and it converges to the correct posterior distribution.

1. (Convergence) Let $P_R^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot)$ be the $s$-th step transition of the approximate exchange algorithm, when the auxiliary network is sampled using $R$ steps of the network simulation algorithm and the initial parameter of the simulation is $\theta_0$. Let $\|\cdot\|_{TV}$ be the total variation distance and $p(\cdot|g, X)$ the posterior distribution. Then, for any $\epsilon > 0$ there exist $R_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ and $S_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for any $R > R_0$ and $s > S_0$ and any initial parameter vector $\theta_0 \in \Theta$

$$\|P_R^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) - p(\cdot|g, X)\|_{TV} \leq \epsilon \quad (29)$$

2. (WLLN) A Weak Law of Large Numbers holds: for any initial parameter vector $\theta_0 \in \Theta$ and any bounded integrable function $h(\cdot)$

$$\frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} h(\theta_s) \xrightarrow{P} \int_{\Theta} h(\theta) p(\theta|g, X) d\theta \quad (30)$$

**Proof.** In Appendix B. $\blacksquare$

The theorem states that the algorithm produces good samples as long as the number of steps of the network simulation algorithm is big enough and the algorithm is run for a sufficient number of iterations.

An important tuning parameter of the algorithm is $R$, the number of network simulations to be performed in the second step. As $R \to \infty$ the algorithm converges to the exact exchange algorithm of Murray et al. (2006), producing exact samples from the posterior distribution. At the same time an higher value of $R$ would increase the computational cost and result in a higher rejection rate for the proposed parameters. I do not propose an optimal
way to choose $R$, but I provide some evidence with simulated data in Appendix B, showing that there is not much difference in the estimates or convergence using different $R$’s. The value of $R$ has a stronger effect on the standard deviation than on the mean of the posterior, as one would expect.

### 3.3 Connections to Exponential Random Graphs

Considerable attention has been paid to exponential random graph models (ERGM). The latter are statistical models of random network formation, with complex dependence structures among links. Exponential random graphs have been successfully used to fit social networks, providing a useful benchmark for alternative models. However, as any random network formation model, they lack the equilibrium microfoundations of the strategic literature.

A remarkable feature of my model is that it contains the exponential random graph models as a special case. Assume that the utility functions $u$, $m$ and $v$ depend linearly on a vector of parameters. Define \( \theta_u = (\theta_{u1}, \theta_{u2}, ..., \theta_{uP})' \), \( \theta_m = (\theta_{m1}, \theta_{m2}, ..., \theta_{mL})' \) and \( \theta_v = (\theta_{v1}, \theta_{v2}, ..., \theta_{vS})' \). Define the function \( H : \mathbb{R}^A \times \mathbb{R}^A \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \).

**ASSUMPTION 4 (Linearity of Utility)** The utility functions are linear in parameters

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_{ij} &= u(X_i, X_j, \theta_u) = \sum_{p=1}^{P} \theta_{up} H_{up} (X_i, X_j) = \theta_u' H_u (X_i, X_j) \\
    m_{ij} &= m(X_i, X_j, \theta_m) = \sum_{l=1}^{L} \theta_{ml} H_{ml} (X_i, X_j) = \theta_m' H_m (X_i, X_j) \\
    v_{ij} &= v(X_i, X_j, \theta_v) = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \theta_{vs} H_{vs} (X_i, X_j) = \theta_v' H_v (X_i, X_j)
\end{align*}
\]

This assumption leaves room for many interesting specifications. In particular, the functions $H$ do not exclude interactions among different characteristics, for example interactions of race and gender of both individuals. We can consider different specifications, including different sets of variables for direct, mutual and indirect links. Interactions of individual and network-level attributes are also possible.

---

*Frank and Strauss (1986)* developed the theory of Markov random graphs. These are models of random network formation in which there is dependence among links: the probability that a link occurs depends on the existence of other links. *Wasserman and Pattison (1996)* generalized the Markov random graphs to general dependence structures, developing the Exponential Random graph models. *Snijders (2002)* reviews these models and the related estimation techniques.
The main consequence of the linearity assumption is that the stationary equilibrium of the model belongs to the exponential family (Lehman (1983)).

**PROPOSITION 4 (Exponential Family Likelihood)**

Under Assumptions 1-4, the stationary distribution $\pi(g, X)$ belongs to the exponential family, i.e., it can be written in the form

$$
\pi(g, X) = \frac{\exp[\theta^t t(g, X)]}{\sum_{\omega \in G} \exp[\theta^t t(\omega, X)]},
$$

where $\theta = (\theta_u, \theta_m, \theta_v)'$ is a (column) vector of parameters and $t(g, X)$ is a (column) vector of canonical statistics.

**Proof.** See Appendix A

The vector $t(g, X) = (t_1(g, X), ..., t_K(g, X))$ is a vector of sufficient statistics for the network formation model. This vector can contain the number of links, the number of whites-to-whites links, the number of male-to-female links and so on. Interactions between different variables are possible, e.g. the number of black-males-to-white-females links, or interactions of individual controls with school-level controls.

This likelihood is very similar to the one of exponential random graph models. My theoretical model can be interpreted as providing the microfoundations for exponential random graphs. In this sense, we can interpret the ERGM as the stationary equilibrium of a strategic game of network formation, where myopic agents follow a stochastic best response dynamics and utilities are linear functions of the parameters.

### 3.4 Identification and Practical Implementation

The identification of parameters for the linear utility case follows from the theory of exponential families (Lehman, 1983). Identification is guaranteed as long as the sufficient statistics $t(g, X)$ are not linearly dependent. The nonlinear case is more complex and there are no general conditions that guarantee identification.\(^{32}\) For this reason, I consider estimation of the model only in the linear case.

\(^{32}\)Geyer (1992) provides some guidance in this matter. He provides conditions that guarantee convergence of the Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood estimate to the exact MLE. However, to the best of my knowledge, there are no sufficient conditions that guarantee identification in this setting.
The Bayesian framework can help to achieve identification of the parameters in the non-linear case, by careful use of prior distributions. This is standard practice in the DSGE estimation literature, where parameters are often ill-identified and prior distributions are used to produce more precise estimates (\cite{?}). This possibility is not explored here, and it is left to future research.

The linear case also allows for specifications of the utility function involving network-level controls, when estimation is performed using multiple networks. This can be achieved by a specification of the parameters

$$\theta_p = \theta_{p0} + \sum_{c=1}^{C} \theta_{pc} Z_c$$

(32)

where $Z_c$ is a network-level variable. This specification allows network fixed effects and interactions of network controls with individual controls. The estimation methodology presented above can be applied to this specification without any change. However, estimation of a model with random coefficients would require significant additional computational effort (see Appendix C).

As noted above, it is possible to modify the precision of the estimates when there is some previous information that can be incorporated in the prior. I choose somewhat vague priors for the parameters, in order to extract most of the information from the data. I assume independent normal priors

$$p(\theta) = \mathcal{N}(0, 3I_P),$$

(33)

where $P$ is the number of parameters.

The proposal distribution for the posterior simulation is

$$q_\theta(\cdot|\theta) = \mathcal{N}(0, \delta \Sigma),$$

(34)

where $\delta$ is a scaling factor and $\Sigma$ is a covariance matrix. I use an adaptive procedure to determine a suitable $\Sigma$. I start the iterations with $\Sigma = \lambda I_P$, where $\lambda$ is a vector of standard deviations. I choose $\lambda$ so that the sampler accepts at least 20%-25% of the proposed parameters, as is standard in the literature (\cite{Gelman et al., 2003; Robert and Casella, 2005}). I run the chain and monitor convergence using standard methods. Once the chains have reached approximate convergence, I estimate the covariance matrix of the chains and use it as an approximate $\Sigma$. The scaling factor is $\delta = 2.38^2 / P$ as suggested in \cite{Gelman et al. (1996)}.

The network sampler uses a proposal $q_g(g|g')$, that selects a link to be updated at each period according to a discrete uniform distribution. The probability of network inversion is $p_{inv} = 0.01$.

The posterior distributions shown in the graphs are obtained with a simulation of 100000
Figure 3: A School Network

white = Whites; blue = African Americans; yellow = Asians; green = Hispanics; red = Others

Note: The graphs represent the friendship network of a school extracted from AddHealth. Each dot represents a student, each arrow is a friend nomination. The colors represent racial groups.

Metropolis-Hastings updates of the parameters. These simulations start from values found after extensive experimentation with different starting values and burn-in periods, monitoring convergence using standard methods. For each parameter update, I simulate the network for 3000 iterations to collect a sample from the stationary distribution.

3.5 The Add Health Data

The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) is a dataset containing information on a nationally representative sample of US schools. The survey started in 1994, when the 90118 participants were entering grades 7-12, and the project collected
data in four successive waves. Each student responded to an *in-school* questionnaire, and a subsample of 20745 was given an *in-home* interview to collect more detailed information about behaviors, characteristics and health status. In this paper I use only data from the saturated sample of Wave I, containing information on 16 schools. Each student in this sample completed both the in-school and in-home questionnaires, and the researchers made a significant effort to avoid any missing information on the students.

I exclude the two largest schools, school 58 and 77, which have respectively 811 and 1664 students, while the third largest school has 159 students. This is for convenience: the estimation routine is much faster when schools are of similar size, since the parallel version of the exchange algorithm can propose a new parameter vector only after *all* the school level simulations are done. Therefore the speed of the algorithm depends on the simulation speed of the largest school. The simulation of a school with more than 800 or 1600 students would significantly slow down the simulations and estimation routines. My final sample includes 1139 students enrolled in 14 schools.

The *in-school* questionnaire collects the social network of each participant. Each student was given a school roster and was asked to identify up to five male and five female friends. I use the friendship nominations as proxy for the social network in a school. The resulting network is *directed*: Paul may nominate Jim, but this does not necessarily imply that Jim nominates Paul. The model developed in this paper takes this feature of the data into account.

A sub-sample of 20745 students was also given an *in-home* questionnaire, that collected most of the sensible data. I use data on racial group, grade and gender of individuals. A student with a missing value in any of these variables is dropped from the sample. Each student that declares to be of Hispanic origin is considered Hispanic. The remaining non-Hispanic students are assigned to the racial group they declared. Therefore the racial categories are: White, Black, Asian, Hispanic and Other race. Other race contains Native Americans.

Additionally, I control for homophily in income. I construct the income of the family us-

---

33 More details about the sampling design and the representativeness are contained in Moody (2001) and the Add Health website [http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/projects/addhealth](http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/projects/addhealth)

34 While this sample contains no missing covariate information for the students, there are several missing values for the parental variables.

35 One can think that this limit could bias the friendship data, but only 3% of the students nominated 10 friends (Moody, 2001). Moreover, the estimation routine could be easily extended to deal with missing links, as reported in Appendix.

36 Some authors do not take into account this feature of the data and they recode the friendships as mutual: if a student nominates another one, the opposite nomination is also assumed.
ing a question from the parent questionnaire.\footnote{There are several cases in which the family income is missing. For those observations, I imputed values drawn from the unconditional income distribution of the community. An alternative but computationally very costly alternative is to introduce an additional step in the simulation, in which the imputation of missing incomes is done at each iteration.} In the estimated models I control for income difference between the students and income levels.

There may be some unobservable variables that affect network formation. For example some students may be ”cool” and receive more friendship links than others. To partially control for such effects, I use information from the interviewer remarks about the physical attractiveness and personality of the student interviewed. I define a dummy variable ”beauty”, which is equal to 1 if the interviewer told that the students was very attractive. Analogously, the dummy ”personality” is equal to 1 if the interviewer responded that the personality of the student was very attractive. Additionally, I control for school fixed effects using school dummies. As an alternative to such approach, in Appendix I provide an extension of the model and estimation method that allows for unobserved heterogeneity with a significant additional computational cost.

Descriptive statistics are in Table 1. The smallest school has 20 enrolled students while the largest used in estimation has 159 students. There is a certain amount of variation in the number of links: some schools are more social and form many links per capita, while other schools have very few friendship nominations. The ratio of boys to girls is balanced in almost all schools, except school 369, where female students are large majority.

Panel A summarizes the racial composition. Many schools are almost racially homogeneous. School 1, 28, 126 and 175 are more diverse as reflected in the Racial Fragmentation index. This is an index that measure the degree of heterogeneity of a population. It is interpreted as the probability that two randomly chosen students in the school belong to different racial groups.\footnote{If there are $K$ racial groups and the share of each race is $s_k$, the index is

$$FRAG = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} (s_k)^2$$

} An index of 0 indicates that there is only one racial group and the population is perfectly homogeneous. Higher values of the index represents increasing levels of racial heterogeneity. Panel B summarizes the grade composition. Most schools offer all grades from 7th to 12th, with homogeneous population across grades. Several schools only have lower grades.

Panel C analyzes the racial and gender segregation of each school friendship network. The level of segregation is measured with the Freeman (1972) segregation index. If there is
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the schools in the Saturated Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>28</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>106</th>
<th>115</th>
<th>126</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>194</th>
<th>369</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1664</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>3290</td>
<td>3604</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.587</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Racial Composition

|        | Whites | 0.5 | 0.95 | 0.983 | 0.981 | 0.973 | 0.42 | 0.978 | 0.055 | 0.989 | 0 | 1 | 0.472 | 0.769 | 0.977 | 0.942 |
|        | Blacks | 0.236 | 0 | 0 | 0.006 | 0.018 | 0.453 | 0.002 | 0.233 | 0 | 0.963 | 0 | 0.151 | 0.019 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Asians | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.299 | 0.01 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Hispanics | 0.364 | 0.05 | 0.017 | 0.006 | 0 | 0.107 | 0.011 | 0.392 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.025 | 0 | 0.302 | 0.154 | 0.023 | 0.058 |
|        | Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.013 | 0.004 | 0.02 | 0 | 0.011 | 0 | 0 | 0.038 | 0.019 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Racial Fragm | 0.599 | 0.095 | 0.034 | 0.037 | 0.053 | 0.606 | 0.044 | 0.699 | 0.04 | 0.022 | 0.072 | 0 | 0.661 | 0.382 | 0.045 | 0.109 |

B. Grade Composition

|        | 7th Grade | 0.159 | 0.2 | 0.128 | 0.145 | 0.227 | 0.173 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.112 | 0.144 | 0.506 | 0.4 | 0.491 | 0.462 | 0.488 | 0.538 |
|        | 8th Grade | 0.159 | 0.217 | 0.154 | 0.157 | 0.2 | 0.173 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.153 | 0.178 | 0.481 | 0.6 | 0.472 | 0.538 | 0.488 | 0.462 |
|        | 9th Grade | 0.114 | 0.2 | 0.12 | 0.214 | 0.136 | 0.2 | 0.289 | 0.004 | 0.153 | 0.122 | 0.012 | 0 | 0.038 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|        | 10th Grade | 0.273 | 0.133 | 0.205 | 0.157 | 0.182 | 0.167 | 0.277 | 0.346 | 0.214 | 0.167 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|        | 11th Grade | 0.136 | 0.167 | 0.179 | 0.164 | 0.118 | 0.14 | 0.223 | 0.345 | 0.265 | 0.211 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.023 | 0 |
|        | 12th Grade | 0.159 | 0.083 | 0.214 | 0.164 | 0.136 | 0.147 | 0.205 | 0.301 | 0.102 | 0.178 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

C. Segregation

|        | Segr Whites | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.720 | 0.005 | 0.266 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0.573 | 0.115 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Segr Blacks | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0.764 | 0 | 0.790 | - | - | 0 | - | 0.179 | 0 | - | - |
|        | Segr Asian | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.744 | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | - | - |
|        | Segr Hisp | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.429 | 0 | 0.691 | - | - | 0 | - | - | 0.227 | 0.025 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Segr Other | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.026 | - | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - | - |
|        | Segr Gender | 0.250 | 0.100 | 0.140 | 0.341 | 0.069 | 0.255 | 0.221 | 0.287 | 0.264 | 0.176 | 0.258 | 0.168 | 0.129 | 0.122 | 0.262 | 0.156 |

Descriptive statistics of the saturated sample for Wave 1 of Add Health. Segregation is measured with the Freeman (1972) segregation index. The index varies from 0 (perfect integration) to 1 (perfect segregation). The racial fragmentation index measures the probability that two randomly chosen students belong to different racial groups. Higher values of the index indicate a more racially heterogeneous population.
no segregation, the number of links among individuals of different groups does not depend on the group identity. The index measures the difference between the expected and actual number of links among individuals of different groups. An index of 0 means that the actual network closely resembles one in which links are formed at random. Higher values indicate more segregation. The index varies between 0 and 1, where the maximum corresponds to a network in which there are no cross-group links.

Since most schools are racially homogeneous, the measured segregation is zero. Schools with a racially diverse student population show high level of segregation for each racial group. On the other hand gender segregation is quite low and homogeneous across schools.

4 Empirical Results

In Table 2, I show the estimation results for the full structural model, using the 14 schools in the Add Health saturated sample. The table summarizes the marginal posterior distributions of the estimated parameters with posterior mean, median, standard deviation, 5th and 95th quantiles. Figures 4 and 5 display the marginal posterior distributions and in red the posterior mean. The blue dotted line represents the prior distribution. In a web appendix, I report results from alternative specifications and estimates using only one network.

Each estimate measures the marginal effect of the variable: for example, the parameter associated with the direct utility of WHITE-WHITE measures the marginal utility of a white student when forming a link to another white student, other things being equal.

Panel A shows the estimates for the direct utility. There is evidence of homophily in preferences: individuals prefer to form friendship links to students of the same gender, grade, race, other things being equal. Racial homophily is not homogenous across groups: African Americans show stronger preference for same race students, while the group of Hispanics has the lowest magnitude. Grade homophily is also very high.

Furthermore, there is a clear difference in how the different racial groups respond to a change in the fraction of their own group in the population. While Whites and African Americans’ preference for same race students decreases with the fraction of their group in the population, the opposite occurs for Hispanics. This result is important, because it implies that different racial groups have different responses to the desegregation policies: some group may engage more in interracial friendships, while some group may segregate even more.

Physically attractive students have similar propensity to form friendships than the rest of the population. The same holds for students with very attractive personalities. Nonetheless, there is a propensity to form links to individuals that are physically attractive and have...
Table 2: Posterior Distribution, Structural Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>std. dev</th>
<th>5 pctile</th>
<th>95 pctile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Direct utility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-4.8615</td>
<td>-4.8325</td>
<td>0.3124</td>
<td>-5.4380</td>
<td>-4.4058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAME GENDER</td>
<td>0.1340</td>
<td>0.1366</td>
<td>0.1091</td>
<td>-0.0517</td>
<td>0.3062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAME GRADE</td>
<td>2.0287</td>
<td>2.0262</td>
<td>0.1298</td>
<td>1.8141</td>
<td>2.2460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE-WHITE</td>
<td>0.4408</td>
<td>0.4383</td>
<td>0.1654</td>
<td>0.1714</td>
<td>0.7288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK-BLACK</td>
<td>0.6802</td>
<td>0.6868</td>
<td>0.1312</td>
<td>0.4704</td>
<td>0.8727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISP-HISP</td>
<td>0.1649</td>
<td>0.1742</td>
<td>0.0856</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
<td>0.2904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTRACTIVE i (Physical)</td>
<td>-0.0091</td>
<td>-0.0100</td>
<td>0.1547</td>
<td>-0.2621</td>
<td>0.2546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTRACTIVE j (Physical)</td>
<td>0.1876</td>
<td>0.1727</td>
<td>0.1490</td>
<td>-0.0300</td>
<td>0.1442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTRACTIVE i (Personality)</td>
<td>0.0095</td>
<td>0.0093</td>
<td>0.1411</td>
<td>-0.2196</td>
<td>0.2426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTRACTIVE j (Personality)</td>
<td>0.2370</td>
<td>0.2337</td>
<td>0.1209</td>
<td>0.0401</td>
<td>0.4383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG OF (INCOME i/INCOME j)</td>
<td>-0.0182</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
<td>0.0267</td>
<td>-0.0630</td>
<td>0.0230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG OF (INCOME i × INCOME j)</td>
<td>0.0685</td>
<td>0.0685</td>
<td>0.0277</td>
<td>0.0237</td>
<td>0.1147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRACTION WHITES</td>
<td>-1.5015</td>
<td>-1.4433</td>
<td>0.4602</td>
<td>-2.3086</td>
<td>-0.8500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRACTION BLACKS</td>
<td>1.9019</td>
<td>1.9234</td>
<td>0.1829</td>
<td>1.5583</td>
<td>2.1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRACTION HISP</td>
<td>0.2845</td>
<td>0.2547</td>
<td>0.5496</td>
<td>-0.5504</td>
<td>1.2862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE-WHITE * % WHITES</td>
<td>-0.5351</td>
<td>-0.5470</td>
<td>0.1752</td>
<td>-0.7980</td>
<td>-0.2179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK-BLACK * % BLACKS</td>
<td>-0.1780</td>
<td>-0.1227</td>
<td>0.3854</td>
<td>-0.8700</td>
<td>0.3626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL 1</td>
<td>-1.3334</td>
<td>-1.3416</td>
<td>0.2658</td>
<td>-2.0527</td>
<td>-0.6015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL 2</td>
<td>1.6555</td>
<td>1.6527</td>
<td>0.2658</td>
<td>1.2191</td>
<td>2.1068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL 3</td>
<td>0.3550</td>
<td>0.3461</td>
<td>0.3108</td>
<td>-0.1381</td>
<td>0.8907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL 4</td>
<td>0.8271</td>
<td>0.8159</td>
<td>0.3129</td>
<td>0.3315</td>
<td>1.3665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL 5</td>
<td>1.1032</td>
<td>1.1076</td>
<td>0.2803</td>
<td>0.6407</td>
<td>1.5603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL 6</td>
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<td><strong>B. Mutual utility</strong></td>
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<td><strong>C. Indirect utility and Popularity</strong> (v_{ij})</td>
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<td>0.1678</td>
<td>0.1083</td>
<td>-0.0141</td>
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</table>

Estimated posterior distribution for the full structural model. The estimates are obtained with a sample of 100000 parameter simulations, and 3000 network simulations for each parameter proposal.
attractive personalities. Income differences decrease the likelihood of friendship, while higher income levels increase the number of friendships formed. The magnitude of the income effects is smaller than the effect of racial preferences. The total number of friends is higher in schools with higher fraction of minorities. The estimates for the school dummies show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the network formation process across schools, which is
Figure 5: Posterior Distribution, Full Structural Model (continued)

Estimated posterior distribution for the full structural model. Each graph shows the histogram of the simulation output. The red line indicates the posterior mean, while the blue dotted line is the prior distribution. The estimates are obtained with a sample of 100000 parameter simulations and 3000 network simulations for each proposed parameter.

not accounted for by the individual characteristics.

Panel B shows the estimated parameters of the mutual utility. An additional mutual link provides positive additional utility. There is evidence of homophily in mutual links for gender, Whites and Hispanics. A mutual link to a student of the same grade decreases utility. The mutual link provides additional utility if the students have similar physical attractive-
ness and their personalities do not coincide.

Panel C contains estimates of the indirect and popularity effects. The negative value of the constant can be interpreted as a congestion effect: linking to students with many friends decreases utility. There is evidence of homophily in the indirect and popularity effects (except for gender), which increases the incentives of the students to segregate.

As a benchmark to evaluate policy experiments, I also estimated a model without mu-

<table>
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<th>Table 3: Posterior Distribution, Direct Utility only</th>
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<td>ATTRACTIVE j (Physical)</td>
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<td>ATTRACTIVE i (Personality)</td>
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<td>ATTRACTIVE j (Personality)</td>
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<td>SCHOOL 13</td>
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</table>

Estimated posterior distribution for the model with utility from direct links only. The estimates are obtained with a sample of 100000 parameter simulations, and 3000 network simulations for each parameter proposal.

The results are shown in Table 3. In this specification, the homophily effects in the direct utility are stronger than in the richer model. This is because in the full model part of the homophily effects are captured by indirect utility and popularity. Whites have much higher marginal utility of forming a link to a person of the same race than in the full model. Moreover, this specification would suggest that Whites preferences for same race contacts are stronger than Blacks, which is the opposite result.
found in the full model.

An increase in the fraction of same race individuals has asymmetric effects on the racial groups: Whites and Hispanics decrease their links, while African Americans form more friendships. This is different from the full model.

4.1 Policy Experiments

I use the estimated model to predict how alternative policies affect the network structure. Policy makers may be interested in pursuing policies that promote racial integration, or they may consider policies that create separate schools for boys and girls. Simulations of the model in alternative scenarios can provide a valuable benchmark on the possible effects of such policies.

I consider the effectiveness of busing programs in promoting interracial integration. Using the posterior distribution estimated in Table 2, I simulate several busing programs that redistribute students of different racial groups among schools 88 and 106 of my sample. These are two schools with an homogeneous student population: 98.9% Whites and 96.3% African Americans, respectively. The simulated policies randomly select several (white) students from school 88 and enroll them in school 106; the same number of (black) students is randomly selected from school 106 and enrolled in school 88. This allows me to modify the ratio of Whites and African Americans in both schools and predict the levels of segregation and welfare implied by the policy.\footnote{There are several alternative ways to implement this desegregation policy. For example, one could select students based on their race, while keeping a balance for gender and income distribution. My implementation is simple. I order students of different racial groups based on their numerical ID in the data (from lowest to highest). If I need to implement a policy that re-assigns 10 students, I select the first 10 students in the list.}

Using 1000 draws from the estimated posterior distribution, I run the network formation model for 10000 iterations after the policy change (using ALGORITHM 1) and compute segregation and welfare of the realized networks. I use Freeman’s segregation index (see Freeman (1972) and Appendix B) to measure segregation for the relevant groups: Whites, African-Americans and gender. The welfare measure is the total utility of the school, i.e. the sum of all students’ utilities. I simulate the model using both the full structural specification and the specification with direct utility only, to compare the policy implications. The results of the simulations are shown in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9. The figures report the average segregation and welfare as a function of the fraction of Whites and African Americans in the school. The blue dots are the average welfare and segregation obtained from each simulation. The
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and 106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.

The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and 106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.

vertical dotted line indicates the situation of perfect integration among schools, i.e. a policy where the students of each racial group are equally split among the schools. The red dotted line is a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results. The curve is fitted using least squares and all the coefficients are statistically significant.

The simulations provide several results. First, a policy that implements perfect integration among the two schools is not optimal, both in terms of welfare and segregation. Perfect racial integration among the schools does not minimize expected segregation in the network of friendships and does not maximize welfare. A certain degree of segregation among schools is necessary to increase interracial contact and welfare within schools.

Second, the policy does not have the same effect on both schools. The comparison of
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and 106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.

Figures 6 and 8 show that the relationship between the fraction of each racial group and segregation is not the same. For school 88 the relationship is cubic, while for school 106 is quadratic. This further complicates the design of a good desegregation program.

Third, the model with only direct utility provides different policy recommendations than the full specification with mutual utility, indirect utility and popularity effects. This is quite evident from the graphs on welfare. For school 88, an increase of African American enrollment which does not exceed 50%, does not cause a dramatic change in welfare. The picture is completely different when looking at Figure 7. In addition, the levels of segregation predicted by the full specification are more extreme than the ones under the simpler specification.
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and 106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.

5 Conclusions

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of strategic network formation with heterogeneous agents. The paper contributes to the economic literature on network formation in two ways. First, while most strategic models have multiple equilibria, I establish the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium, which characterizes the likelihood of observing a specific network structure in the data. As a consequence, I can estimate and identify the structural parameters using only one observation of the network at a single point in time. Second, I propose a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that drastically reduces the computational burden for estimating the posterior distribution. In this model, the likelihood function cannot be evaluated or approximated with precision: a state-of-the-
Figure 9: Policy Experiments for School 106 (only direct links)

The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and 106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.

The model can be used to infer the effect of different policies on network structure. To overcome this problem, my algorithm generates samples from the posterior distribution and avoids the evaluation of the likelihood. Using the properties of the stationary equilibrium, I reduce the computational burden even further and I am able to study high dimensional models.

The model simulations provide predictions about the expected levels of segregation and welfare implied by busing programs. Perfect integration among schools could deliver unexpected results in some contexts: segregation may increase and welfare decrease. In addition, the busing program may have different effects in different schools. These results suggest that desegregation
policies must be carefully designed to avoid unexpected outcomes.

The model can be easily extended to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in individual quality and preferences. The Bayesian estimation strategy can be adapted to estimate models with missing links, using data augmentation techniques. These improvements come with a substantial increase in the computational burden, but also provide a more realistic model. Both these extensions are reviewed and explained in Appendix C.

The methodology introduced in this work can be used in different settings. Models of social interactions with sequential moves as in Nakajima (2007) share the same simple equilibrium characterization presented in this work. In these models individuals interact in an exogenous network and their actions are optimally chosen given the action of their neighbors. The estimation techniques developed here are easily adapted to these settings.\footnote{In principle, several models that admit a characterization as potential games could be estimated using the algorithm proposed in this paper.}

The methodology can be applied to the class of autologistic models in spatial econometrics.\footnote{Besag (1974) provides a description of these models and a simple approximate estimation strategy.} The latter are models for spatial binary data that explicitly model the spatial dependence among variables. The likelihood of these models has the same exponential form with normalizing constant derived in this paper, but their estimation has relied on approximate methods: Maximum Pseudolikelihood (Besag, 1974) or Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (Geyer and Thompson, 1992). My estimation strategy provides a valid alternative from a Bayesian perspective.

References


41In principle, several models that admit a characterization as potential games could be estimated using the algorithm proposed in this paper.

42Besag (1974) provides a description of these models and a simple approximate estimation strategy.


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A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

The potential is a function $Q$ from the space of actions to the real line such that $Q(g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) - Q(g'_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) = U_i(g_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X) - U_i(g'_{ij}, g_{-ij}, X)$, for any $ij$.\(^{43}\) A simple computation shows that, for any $ij$

$$Q(g_{ij} = 1, g_{-ij}, X) - Q(g_{ij} = 0, g_{-ij}, X) = u_{ij} + g_{ji}m_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{jk}v_{ik} + \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ki}v_{kj}$$

therefore $Q$ is the potential of the network formation game. The welfare function is computed as

$$W(g, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i(g, X)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij}u_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij}g_{ji}m_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{jk}v_{ik} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ki}v_{kj}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij}u_{ij} + 2\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j>i}^{n} g_{ij}g_{ji}m_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{jk}v_{ik} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ki}v_{kj}$$

$$= Q(g, X) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j>i}^{n} g_{ij}g_{ji}m_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{kj}v_{ik} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} g_{ki}v_{kj}$$

Proof of Proposition 2

1) The existence of Nash equilibria follows directly from the fact that the network formation game is a potential game with finite strategy space. (see Monderer and Shapley (1996) for details)

2) The set of Nash equilibria is defined as the set of $g^*$ such that, for every $i$ and for every $g_{ij} \neq g_{ij}^*$

$$U_i(g_{ij}^*, g_{-ij}^*, X) \geq U_i(g_{ij}, g_{-ij}^*, X)$$

Therefore, since $Q$ is a potential function, for every $g_{ij} \neq g_{ij}^*$

$$Q(g_{ij}^*, g_{-ij}^*, X) \geq Q(g_{ij}, g_{-ij}^*, X)$$

\(^{43}\) For more details and definitions see Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Therefore \( g^* \) is a maximizer of \( Q \). The converse is easily checked by the same reasoning.

3) Suppose \( g^t = g^* \). Since this is a Nash equilibrium, no player will be willing to change her linking decision when her turn to play comes. Therefore, once the chain reaches a Nash equilibrium, it cannot escape from that state.

4) The probability that the potential will increase from \( t \) to \( t + 1 \) is

\[
Pr \left[ Q \left( g^{t+1}, X \right) \geq Q \left( g^t, X \right) \right] =
\]

\[
\sum_i \sum_j Pr \left( m^{t+1} = ij \right) Pr \left[ U_i \left( g^{t+1}_{ij}, X \right) \geq U_i \left( g^t_{ij}, X \right) \right] = 1 \text{ because agents play Best Response, conditioning on } m^{t+1}
\]

\[
= \sum_i \sum_j \rho_{ij} = 1.
\]

By part 3) of the proposition, a Nash network is an absorbing state of the chain. Therefore any probability distribution that puts probability 1 on a Nash network is a stationary distribution. For any initial network, the chain will converge to one of the stationary distributions. It follows that in the long run the model will be in a Nash network, i.e. for any \( g^0 \in \mathcal{G} \)

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} Pr \left[ g^t \in NE \mid g^0 \right] = 1.
\]

**Proof of Theorem 1**

1. The sequence of networks \([g^0, g^1, ...]\) generated by the network formation game is a markov chain. Inspection of the transition probability proves that the chain is irreducible and aperiodic, therefore it is ergodic. The existence of a unique stationary distribution then follows from the ergodic theorem (see Gelman et al. (1996) for details).

2. A sufficient condition for stationarity is the *detailed balance* condition. In our case this requires

\[
P_{gg'} \pi_g = P_{g'g} \pi_{g'}
\]

where

\[
P_{gg'} = Pr \left( g^{t+1} = g' \mid g^t = g \right)
\]

\[
\pi_g = \pi \left( g^t = g \right)
\]

Notice that the transition from \( g \) to \( g' \) is possible if these networks differ by only one element \( g_{ij} \). Otherwise the transition probability is zero and the detailed balance condition is satisfied.
Let’s consider the nonzero probability transitions, with \( g = (1, g_{-ij}) \) and \( g' = (0, g_{-ij}) \). Define \( \Delta Q \equiv Q (1, g_{-ij}, X) - Q (0, g_{-ij}, X) \).

\[
P_{gg'} \pi_g = \Pr (m^t = ij) \Pr (g_{ij} = 0|g_{-ij}) \frac{\exp \left[ Q (1, g_{-ij}, X) \right]}{\sum_{\omega \in G} \exp \left[ Q (\omega, X) \right]} \times \frac{1}{1 + \exp [\Delta Q]} \times \frac{\exp \left[ Q (0, g_{-ij}, X) \right]}{\sum_{\omega \in G} \exp \left[ Q (\omega, X) \right]} = \Pr (m^t = ij) \Pr (g_{ij} = 1|g_{-ij}) \frac{\exp \left[ Q (0, g_{-ij}, X) \right]}{\sum_{\omega \in G} \exp \left[ Q (\omega, X) \right]} = P_{g'g} \pi_{g'}
\]

So the distribution (14) satisfies the detailed balance condition. Therefore it is a stationary distribution for the network formation model. From part 1) of the proposition, we know that the process is ergodic and it has a unique stationary distribution. Therefore \( \pi (g, X) \) is also the unique stationary distribution.

**Proof of Proposition 4**

The proof consists of showing that \( Q (g, X) \) can be written in the form \( \theta' t (g, X) \). Consider the first part of the potential

\[
\sum_i \sum_j g_{ij} u_{ij} = \sum_i \sum_j g_{ij} \sum_{p=1}^P \theta_{up} H_{up} (X_i, X_j) = \sum_{p=1}^P \theta_{up} \sum_i \sum_j g_{ij} H_{up} (X_i, X_j) = \sum_{p=1}^P \theta_{up} t_{up} (g, X) = \theta'_u t_u (g, X)
\]

where \( t_{up} (g, X) \equiv \sum_i \sum_j g_{ij} H_{up} (X_i, X_j) \), \( \theta_u = (\theta_{u1}, ..., \theta_{uP})' \) and \( t_u (g, X) = (t_{u1} (g, X), ..., t_{uP} (g, X))' \).

Analogously define \( \theta_m = (\theta_{m1}, \theta_{m2}, ..., \theta_{mL})' \) and \( t_m (g, X) = (t_{m1} (g, X), t_{m2} (g, X), ..., t_{mL} (g, X))' \)
and \( \theta_v = (\theta_{v1}, \theta_{v2}, ..., \theta_{vS})' \) and \( t_v (g, X) = (t_{v1} (g, X), t_{v2} (g, X), ..., t_{vS} (g, X))' \). It follows that

\[
\sum_i \sum_{j>i} g_{ij} g_{ji} m_{ij} = \sum_i \sum_{j>i} g_{ij} g_{ji} \sum_{l=1}^L \theta_{ml} H_{ml} (X_i, X_j)
\]
\[
= \sum_{l=1}^L \theta_{ml} \sum_i \sum_{j>i} g_{ij} g_{ji} H_{ml} (X_i, X_j)
\]
\[
= \sum_{l=1}^L \theta_{ml} t_{ml} (g, X)
\]
\[
= \theta'_m t_m (g, X)
\]

and

\[
\sum_i \sum_{j} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i,j} g_{jk} v_{ij} = \sum_i \sum_{j} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i,j} g_{jk} \sum_{s=1}^S \theta_{vs} H_{vs} (X_i, X_k)
\]
\[
= \sum_{s=1}^S \theta_{vs} \sum_i \sum_{j} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i,j} g_{jk} H_{vs} (X_i, X_k)
\]
\[
= \sum_{s=1}^S \theta_{vs} t_{vs} (g, X)
\]
\[
= \theta'_v t_v (g, X)
\]

Therefore \( Q (g, X) \) can be written in the form \( \theta' t (g, X) \), where \( \theta = (\theta_u, \theta_m, \theta_v)' \) and \( t (g, X) = [t_u (g, X), t_m (g, X), t_v (g, X)]' \).

\[
Q (g, X) = \theta'_u t_u (g, X) + \theta'_m t_m (g, X) + \theta'_v t_v (g, X)
\]
\[
= \theta' t (g, X)
\]

and the stationary distribution is

\[
\pi (g, X) = \frac{\exp [\theta' t (g, X)]}{\sum_{\omega \in \mathcal{G}} \exp [\theta' t (\omega, X)]}.
\]

## B Computational Details

### B.1 Network Simulation

The algorithm used to simulate the network produces samples from the stationary equilibrium of the model. This is the result of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3

Proof.

1. The network simulation algorithm satisfies the detailed balance condition for the stationary distribution $\pi$. Indeed for any given $\theta$

$$
\Pr(g'|g, X, \theta) \pi(g, X, \theta) = q_g(g'|g) \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp[Q(g', X, \theta)] q_g(g|g')}{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta)] q_g(g'|g)} \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c(G, X, \theta)} \right\}
$$

This concludes the proof.

2. The algorithm generates a Markov Chain of network with finite state space. The chain is irreducible and aperiodic and therefore it is uniformly ergodic (see Theorem 4.9, page 52 in Levin et al. (2008)).

3. The bound to the convergence rate was derived by Diaconis and Stroock (1991), for reversible finite chains (see Proposition 3 in their paper).

The algorithm has a very useful property that can be exploited in the posterior simulation to reduce the computational burden. Adapting the suggestion in Liang (2010), define $P_{\theta'}^{(R)}(g'|g)$ as the transition probability of a Markov chain that generates $g'$ with $R$ Metropolis-Hastings updates of the network simulation algorithm, starting at the observed network $g$ and using the proposed parameter $\theta'$. Then,

$$
P_{\theta'}^{(R)}(g'|g) = P_{\theta'}(g^1|g)P_{\theta'}(g^2|g^1) \cdots P_{\theta'}(g'|g^{R-1}),
$$

where $P_{\theta'}(g^j|g^i) = q_g(g^j|g^i)\alpha_{mh}(g^i, g^j)$ is the transition probability of the network simulation algorithm above. Since the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm satisfies the detailed balance condition, we can prove the following.
LEMMA 1 Simulate a network $g'$ from the stationary distribution $\pi(\cdot, X, \theta')$ using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm starting at the network $g$ observed in the data. Then

$$\frac{\mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g)}{\mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g)} = \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta')]}{\exp[Q(g', X, \theta')]}$$  \hspace{1cm} (38)$$

for all $R$, $g, g' \in \mathcal{G}$ and for any $\theta' \in \Theta$.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g)$ be defined as in (37). This is the transition probability of the chain that generates $g'$ with $R$ Metropolis-Hastings updates, starting at the observed network $g$ and using the proposed parameter $\theta'$. Notice that the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm satisfies the detailed balance for $\pi(g, X, \theta')$, therefore we have

$$\mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g) \pi(g', X, \theta') = \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g|R-1) \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g|R-2|g|R-1) \cdots \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g|g_1) \pi(g', X, \theta')$$

$$= \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g|g_1) \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g_2|g_1) \cdots \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g_{R-1}) \pi(g, X, \theta')$$

$$= \mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g) \pi(g, X, \theta').$$

It follows that

$$\frac{\mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g)}{\mathcal{P}^{(R)}(g'|g)} = \frac{\pi(g, X, \theta')}{\pi(g', X, \theta')} \frac{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta')]}{\exp[Q(g', X, \theta')]} \frac{c(\mathcal{G}, X, \theta')}{c(\mathcal{G}, X, \theta')} \frac{\exp[Q(g', X, \theta')]}{\exp[Q(g, X, \theta')]}.$$

This concludes the proof. \qed

One should notice that as long as the algorithm is started from the network $g$ observed in the data (which is assumed to be a draw from the stationary equilibrium of the model), the equality in (38) is satisfied for any $R$. The approximate exchange algorithm presented in this paper removes the requirement of exact sampling by exploiting the property of the stationary equilibrium characterization, described in Lemma 1.

B.2 Posterior Simulation

In this section I provide the technical details for the algorithm proposed in the empirical part of the paper. The first set of results show that the exchange algorithm generate (approximate) samples from the posterior distribution (16).
The original exchange algorithm developed in Murray et al. (2006) is slightly different from the one used here. The main modification is in Step 2: the original algorithm requires an exact sample from the stationary equilibrium of the model.

**ALGORITHM 3 (EXACT EXCHANGE ALGORITHM)**

Start at current parameter \( \theta_t = \theta \) and network data \( g \).

1. Propose a new parameter vector \( \theta' \)
   \[
   \theta' \sim q_\theta(\cdot|\theta) \tag{39}
   \]

2. Draw an exact sample network \( g' \) from the likelihood
   \[
   g' \sim \pi(\cdot|X, \theta') \tag{40}
   \]

3. Compute the acceptance ratio
   \[
   \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp \left[ Q(g', X, \theta) \right] p(\theta') q_\theta(\theta'|\theta') \exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta') \right] c(\theta) c(\theta')}{\exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta) \right] p(\theta) q_\theta(\theta|\theta) \exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta) \right] c(\theta) c(\theta')} \right\} \tag{41}
   \]

4. Update the parameter according to
   \[
   \theta_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
   \theta' & \text{with prob. } \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) \\
   \theta & \text{with prob. } 1 - \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) 
   \end{cases} \tag{42}
   \]

The difference between this algorithm and the approximate one is in step 2. The exact and approximate algorithms use the same acceptance ratio \( \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) \), a consequence of LEMMA 1. Indeed the acceptance ratio for the approximate algorithm is

\[
\tilde{\alpha}_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp \left[ Q(g', X, \theta) \right] p(\theta') q_\theta(\theta'|\theta') \mathcal{P}_{\theta'}^{(R)}(g'|g)}{\exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta) \right] p(\theta) q_\theta(\theta|\theta) \mathcal{P}_{\theta}^{(R)}(g|g)} \right\} \tag{43}
\]

\[
= \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp \left[ Q(g', X, \theta) \right] p(\theta') q_\theta(\theta'|\theta') \exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta) \right]}{\exp \left[ Q(g, X, \theta) \right] p(\theta) q_\theta(\theta|\theta) \exp \left[ Q(g', X, \theta') \right]} \right\} \tag{44}
\]

\[
= \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) \tag{45}
\]

This result implies that to prove the convergence of the approximate algorithm to the exact algorithm, there is no need to prove convergence of \( \tilde{\alpha}_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) \) to \( \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \theta', g', g) \). The convergence of step 2 of the algorithm is sufficient.
B.2.1 Preliminary Lemmas for THEOREM 2

The convergence of the approximate exchange algorithm to the correct posterior distribution is proven in 4 steps.

1. First we prove that the exact exchange algorithm converges to the correct posterior (LEMMA 2).

2. Second, we prove that the approximate algorithm has a stationary distribution and it is ergodic (LEMMA 3, similar to the one in Liang 2010).

3. Third, we prove that the transition kernel of the approximate and exact algorithms are arbitrarily close for a large enough number of network simulations (LEMMA 4).

4. Fourth, we combine previous results to prove that the approximate algorithm converges to the correct posterior.

A similar proof strategy is contained in Liang et al. (2010) and Andrieu and Roberts (2009).

Let $Q(d\varnothing|\theta) = q_{\theta}(\varnothing|\theta) \nu(d\varnothing)$. The transition kernel of the exact exchange algorithm can be written as

$$P(\theta, d\varnothing) = \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \pi(g', \varnothing) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \varnothing, g', g) \right] Q(\theta, d\varnothing)$$

$$+ \delta_{\theta}(d\varnothing) \left\{ 1 - \int_{\Theta} \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \pi(g', \varnothing) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \varnothing, g', g) \right] Q(\theta, d\varnothing) \right\}$$

and the transition kernel of the approximate exchange algorithm can be written as

$$\tilde{P}_R(\theta, d\varnothing) = \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \mathcal{P}_R^{(R)}(g'|g) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \varnothing, g', g) \right] Q(\theta, d\varnothing)$$

$$+ \delta_{\theta}(d\varnothing) \left\{ 1 - \int_{\Theta} \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \mathcal{P}_R^{(R)}(g'|g) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \varnothing, g', g) \right] Q(\theta, d\varnothing) \right\}$$

Let $\eta(\theta)$ be the average rejection probability for the approximate algorithm, i.e.

$$\eta(\theta) := 1 - \int_{\Theta} \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \mathcal{P}_R^{(R)}(g'|g) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \varnothing, g', g) \right] Q(\theta, d\varnothing)$$

(46)
The next lemma proves that the transition kernel satisfies the detailed balance condition for the posterior distribution. For any pair of parameters \((\theta, \vartheta) \in \Theta\) we have

\[
P [\theta, \vartheta|g, X] p (\theta|g, X) = \Pr [\vartheta|\theta, g, X] p (\vartheta|g, X)
\] (47)

The detailed balance condition is sufficient condition for the Markov chain generated by the algorithm to have stationary distribution the posterior (16) (for details see Robert and Casella (2005) or Gelman et al. (2003)).

**LEMMA 2** The exchange algorithm produces a Markov chain with invariant distribution (16).

**Proof.** Define \(Z \equiv \int_{\Theta} \pi (g|X, \theta) p (\theta) d\theta\). In the algorithm the probability \(\Pr [\vartheta|\theta, g, X]\) of transition to \(\theta_j\), given the current parameter \(\theta\) and the observed data \((g, X)\), can be computed as

\[
\Pr [\vartheta|\theta, g, X] = q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta) \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \vartheta)] c_{G, X, \vartheta}}{\alpha_{ex} (\theta, \vartheta, g', g)}.
\] (48)

This is the probability \(q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta)\) of proposing \(\vartheta\) times the probability of generating the new network \(g'\) from the model’s stationary distribution, \(\frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \vartheta)]}{c_{G, X, \vartheta}}\) and accepting the proposed parameter \(\alpha_{ex} (\theta, \vartheta, g', g)\). Therefore the left-hand side of (47) can be written as

\[
\Pr [\vartheta|\theta, g, X] p (\theta|g, X) = q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta) \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \vartheta)]}{c_{G, X, \vartheta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} p (\theta|g, X)
\]

\[
= q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta) \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \vartheta)]}{c_{G, X, \vartheta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} p (\theta|g, X) Z
\]

\[
= q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta) \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \vartheta)]}{c_{G, X, \vartheta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} p (\theta|g, X) Z
\]

\[
\times \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \theta)]}{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]} p (\vartheta) q_\vartheta (\vartheta|\theta) \exp [Q(g', X, \theta)] \right\}
\]

\[
\times \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} p (\theta|g, X) Z
\]

\[
= \min \left\{ q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta) \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \vartheta)]}{c_{G, X, \vartheta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} Z, q_\theta (\vartheta|\theta) \frac{\exp [Q(g', X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} \frac{\exp [Q(g, X, \theta)]}{c_{G, X, \theta}} Z \right\}
\]
\[ q_\theta (\vartheta | \vartheta) \exp \left[ Q' (g', X, \theta) \right] \exp \left[ Q (g, X, \vartheta) \right] p (\vartheta) \times \]
\[ \times \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp \left[ Q' (g', X, \vartheta) \right] p (\vartheta) q_\theta (\vartheta | \vartheta) \exp \left[ Q (g, X, \vartheta) \right]}{\exp \left[ Q (g, X, \vartheta) \right] p (\vartheta) q_\theta (\vartheta | \vartheta) \exp \left[ Q (g', X, \vartheta) \right]} \right\} \]
\[ = q_\theta (\vartheta | \vartheta) \exp \left[ Q' (g', X, \theta) \right] \exp \left[ Q (g, X, \vartheta) \right] p (\vartheta) \times \alpha (\vartheta, \theta, \vartheta, \theta, g') \exp \left[ Q (g, X, \theta) \right] p (\vartheta) \times \]
\[ = q_\theta (\vartheta | \vartheta) \exp \left[ Q' (g', X, \theta) \right] \exp \left[ Q (g, X, \vartheta) \right] p (\vartheta) \times \]
\[ = \Pr \left[ \theta | \vartheta, g, X \right] p (\vartheta | g, X) \]

The latter step proves the detailed balance for a generic network \( g' \). Since the condition is satisfied for any network \( g' \), detailed balance follows from summing over all possible networks.

**Lemma 3** *(The approximate algorithm is ergodic)*

Assume the exact exchange algorithm is ergodic and that for any \( \vartheta \in \Theta \)

\[ \frac{P_{\vartheta} (R)}{\pi (g', \vartheta)} > 0 \quad \text{for any} \quad g' \in G \quad (49) \]

Then for any \( R \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for any \( \theta \in \Theta \), \( \rho (\theta) > 0 \), the transition kernel of the approximate algorithm \( \tilde{P}_R \) is also irreducible and aperiodic, and there exists a stationary distribution \( \tilde{p} (\theta) \) such that

\[ \lim_{s \to \infty} \| \tilde{P}_R^{(s)} (\theta_0, \cdot) - \tilde{p} (\theta) \|_{TV} = 0 \quad (50) \]

**Proof.** The exact algorithm with transition kernel \( P \) is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain. To prove that the approximate algorithm with transition kernel \( \tilde{P}_R \) defines an ergodic Markov chain, it is sufficient to prove that the set of accessible states of \( P \) are also included in those of \( \tilde{P}_R \). The proof proceeds by induction.

Formally, we need to show that for any \( s \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \theta \in \Theta \) and \( A \in \mathcal{B} (\Theta) \) such that \( P^{(s)} (\theta, A) > 0 \), implies \( \tilde{P}_R^{(s)} (\theta, A) > 0 \).

Notice that for any \( \theta \in \Theta \) and \( A \in \mathcal{B} (\Theta) \),

\[ \tilde{P}_R (\theta, A) = \int_A \left[ \sum_{g' \in \Theta} P_{\vartheta}^{(R)} (g' | g) \alpha_{ex} (\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta (\vartheta | \theta) d\vartheta + \mathbb{I} (\theta \in A) \eta (\theta) \]
\[ \geq \int_A \left[ \sum_{g' \in \Theta} \min \left\{ 1, \frac{P_{\vartheta}^{(R)} (g' | g)}{\pi (g', \vartheta)} \right\} \pi (g', \vartheta) \alpha_{ex} (\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta (\vartheta | \theta) d\vartheta + \mathbb{I} (\theta \in A) \eta (\theta) > 0 \]
where the last inequality comes from \( P_{\vartheta}^{(R)}(g'|g) > 0 \) for any \( g' \in \mathcal{G} \) and \( \vartheta \in \Theta \).

This proves that the statement is true when \( s = 1 \). By induction we assume that it is true up to \( s = n \geq 1 \) and for some \( \theta \in \Theta \) chose \( A \in \mathcal{B}(\Theta) \) such that \( P^{(n+1)}(\theta, A) > 0 \) and assume that
\[
\int_{\Theta} \tilde{P}_{\vartheta}^{(n)}(\theta, d\vartheta) \tilde{P}_{R}(\vartheta, A) = 0
\]
This implies that \( \tilde{P}_{R}(\vartheta, A) = 0 \), \( \tilde{P}_{R}^{(n)}(\theta, \cdot) \)-a.s.; by the induction assumption at \( s = 1 \) it follows that \( P(\vartheta, A) = 0 \), \( \tilde{P}_{R}^{(n)}(\theta, \cdot) \)-a.s.

From this and the induction assumption at \( s = n \), \( P(\vartheta, A) = 0 \), \( P^{(n)}(\theta, \cdot) \)-a.s. (assume not, then \( P(\vartheta, A) > 0 \), \( P^{(n)}(\theta, \cdot) \)-a.s. which by induction would imply \( \tilde{P}_{R}(\vartheta, A) > 0 \), which is a contradiction). The latter step contradicts \( P^{(n+1)}(\theta, A) > 0 \) and the result follows.

The next step consists of proving that the transition kernel of the approximate algorithm \( \tilde{P}_{R}(\theta, \vartheta) \) and the exact algorithm \( P(\theta, \vartheta) \) are arbitrarily close for a large enough number of network simulations \( R \). Formally we prove a statement which is equivalent to proving convergence in total variation norm.\(^{44}\)

**Lemma 4 (Convergence of the exact and approximate transition kernels)**

Let \( \epsilon \in (0, 1] \). There exists a number of simulations \( R_0 \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for any function \( \phi : \Theta \to [-1, 1] \) and any \( R > R_0 \),
\[
\left| \tilde{P}_{R}\phi(\theta) - P\phi(\theta) \right| < 2\epsilon
\]  
(51)

**Proof.** The transition of the exchange algorithm is
\[
P(\phi(\theta), \phi(\vartheta)) = \int_{\Theta} \phi(\vartheta) \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \pi(g', \vartheta) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g') \right] q_{\theta}(\vartheta|\theta) d\vartheta
\]
\[
+ \phi(\theta) \left[ 1 - \int_{\Theta} \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \pi(g', \vartheta) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g') \right] q_{\theta}(\vartheta|\theta) d\vartheta \right]
\]
while the transition kernel for the approximate algorithm is
\[
\tilde{P}_{R}(\phi(\theta), \phi(\vartheta)) = \int_{\Theta} \phi(\vartheta) \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} P_{\vartheta}^{(R)}(g'|g) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g') \right] q_{\theta}(\vartheta|\theta) d\vartheta
\]
\[
+ \phi(\theta) \left[ 1 - \int_{\Theta} \left[ \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} P_{\vartheta}^{(R)}(g'|g) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g') \right] q_{\theta}(\vartheta|\theta) d\vartheta \right]
\]

\(^{44}\)See Levin et al. (2008), proposition 4.5, page 49.
and therefore the difference is

\[
S = P(\phi(\theta), \phi(\vartheta)) - \tilde{P}_R(\phi(\theta), \phi(\vartheta))
\]

\[
= \int_\Theta \phi(\vartheta) \left[ \sum_{g', g \in G} \left( \pi(g', \vartheta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta
\]

\[
- \phi(\theta) \int_\Theta \left[ \sum_{g', g \in G} \left( \pi(g', \theta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta
\]

Consider the quantity

\[
S_0 = \int_\Theta \left[ \sum_{g', g \in G} \left( \pi(g', \vartheta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right) \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta
\]

\[
\leq \int_\Theta \left[ \sum_{g', g \in G} \left| \pi(g', \vartheta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right| \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta
\]

and since \( \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \leq 1 \) for any \((\theta, \vartheta) \in \Theta \times \Theta\) and \((g', g) \in G \times G\), we have

\[
S_0 \leq \int_\Theta \left[ \sum_{g', g \in G} \left| \pi(g', \vartheta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right| \alpha_{ex}(\theta, \vartheta, g', g) \right] q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta
\]

\[
= \int_\Theta \left[ 2 \sup_{g' \in G} \left| \pi(g', \vartheta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right| \right] q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta
\]

The convergence of the network simulation algorithm implies that for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), there exists an \( R_0(\vartheta, \varepsilon) \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for any \( R > R_0(\vartheta, \varepsilon) \) and for any \( g \in G \)

\[
2 \sup_{g' \in G} \left| \pi(g', \vartheta) - P^{(R)}(g' | g) \right| \leq \varepsilon
\]

Pick \( R_0(\varepsilon) = \max_{\vartheta \in \Theta} \{ R_0(\vartheta, \varepsilon) \} \). Then for any \( \varepsilon \in (0, 1] \), there is an \( R_0(\varepsilon) \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for any \( R > R_0(\varepsilon) \) and for any \( g \in G \)

\[
S_0 \leq \int_\Theta \epsilon q_\theta(\vartheta | \theta) \, d\vartheta = \epsilon
\]

This implies that

\[
|S| \leq |2S_0| = 2\epsilon
\]

(52)
The next theorem is the main result for the convergence. It states that the approximate exchange algorithm converges to the correct posterior distribution, provided that the number of network simulations and parameter samples are big enough.

### B.2.2 Proof of THEOREM 2

**Proof.** The main idea is to decompose the total variation in two components

\[
\| \hat{P}_R^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) - p(\cdot) \|_{TV} = \| \hat{P}_R^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) - P^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) + P^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) - p(\cdot) \|_{TV} \\
\leq \| \hat{P}_R^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) - P^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) \|_{TV} + \| P^{(s)}(\theta_0, \cdot) - p(\cdot) \|_{TV}
\]

and prove that each component converges. We will use the same idea, but rewrite the total variation in a more convenient form.\(^{45}\) For any function \(\phi : \Theta \to [-1, 1]\) we have

\[
\left| \hat{P}_R^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) - P(\phi(\theta_0) \right| = \left| \hat{P}_R^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) - P^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) + P^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) - p(\phi(\theta_0) \right| \\
\leq \left| \hat{P}_R^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) - P^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) \right| + \left| P^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) - p(\phi(\theta_0) \right|
\]

The second component converges because the exact exchange algorithm is ergodic, as stated in Lemma. For any \(\varepsilon > 0\) there is number of simulation steps \(s(\theta_0, \varepsilon)\), such that for any \(s \geq s(\theta_0, \varepsilon)\)

\[
\left| P^{(s)}(\phi(\theta_0) - p(\phi(\theta_0) \right| \leq \varepsilon
\]

(53)

For the remaining of the proof, I will set \(s_0 := s(\theta_0, \varepsilon)\). I use the telescoping sum decomposition in Andrieu and Roberts (2009) (page 15, adapted from last formula)

\[
\left| \hat{P}_R^{(s_0)}(\phi(\theta_0) - P^{(s_0)}(\phi(\theta_0) \right| = \left| \sum_{l=0}^{s_0-1} \left[ P(l) \hat{P}_R^{(s_0-l)}(\phi(\theta_0) - P(l+1) \hat{P}_R^{(s_0-(l+1))}(\phi(\theta_0) \right| \\
= \left| \sum_{l=0}^{s_0-1} P(l) \left( \hat{P}_R - P \right) \hat{P}_R^{(s_0-(l+1))}(\phi(\theta_0) \right|
\]

Now we can apply \(s_0\) times the result of LEMMA 4 (as in Liang et al. (2010) and Andrieu and Roberts (2009)) to prove that there exists an \(R_0(\theta_0, \varepsilon) \in \mathbb{N}\) such that for any \(R > R_0(\theta_0, \varepsilon)\)

\[
\left| \hat{P}_R^{(s_0)}(\phi(\theta_0) - P^{(s_0)}(\phi(\theta_0) \right| \leq 2s_0\varepsilon
\]

(54)

\(^{45}\)See Levin et al. (2008), proposition 4.5, page 49.
this implies

\[ \left| \bar{P}_{R}^{(s)} \phi (\theta_0) - p (\phi) \right| \leq (2s_0 + 1) \varepsilon \quad (55) \]

We conclude the proof by choosing \( \varepsilon = \epsilon / (2s_0 + 1) \).

This proves that the approximate exchange algorithm is ergodic, therefore the law of large number holds, and the second part of the theorem is proven. \( \blacksquare \)

Figure 10: Convergence to the high density posterior region

Each graph shows convergence to the high density region of the posterior distribution. The curves with different colors represent chains started at overdispersed initial values. The solid black line represents the parameter that generated the data. Convergence is very fast and we can use the initial 2000 iterations as burn-in. In this example the network has \( n = 50 \) agents and the number of network simulations per proposal is \( R = 3000 \).

B.3 Convergence Experiments

In this section, I provide an overview of the convergence properties of the algorithm using examples with artificial data. Assume a toy model with three parameters, with an utility function of the following form

\[
U_i(g, X) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \theta_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} g_{ji} \theta_2 + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i, j; k=1}^{n} g_{jk} \theta_3 + \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \sum_{k \neq i, j; k=1}^{n} g_{ki} \theta_3 \quad (56)
\]

The artificial data are generated using the vector of parameters

\[
\theta = (-2.0, 0.5, 0.01) \quad (57)
\]

To obtain the network dataset for the estimation, the network simulation algorithm is started at a random network and then ran for 1 million iterations. The initial random network is
generated by assuming each link is independent and the probability of a link is \( p = .2 \). The last iteration of this long simulation is used as dataset in all the estimation exercises below. I report results for networks with \( n = 50 \) and \( n = 100 \) agents.

To check if the exchange algorithm converges to the correct region of the parameter space, the parameter simulations are started from 5 over-dispersed starting values

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta^1 &= (-2.0, 0.5, 0.01) \\
\theta^2 &= (-10.0, 5.0, 1.0) \\
\theta^3 &= (10.0, -5.0, -1.0) \\
\theta^4 &= (-3.0, -0.05, 0.3) \\
\theta^5 &= (-20.0, 15.0, -0.3)
\end{align*}
\]

In Figure 10, I display the convergence of the simulations to the high density region of the posterior. In this example the number of network simulations for each parameter proposal is \( R = 3000 \).\(^{46}\) The solid horizontal black line represents the parameter that generated the

\(^{46}\)Similar results hold for different \( R \) values.
data. Each color represents a simulation started at one of the initial values above. After 2000 iterations all the chains have reached approximate convergence to the region of the posterior that contains the data generating parameters. In Figure 11, I show the autocorrelation functions for the same example. In this example the autocorrelation disappears after 200 lags. This is mainly due to the small amount of parameters in this toy model. High-dimensional models show more persistent autocorrelation of the chains. As a consequence, the length of the simulations for the empirical application is much longer. In Figure 12 I show the same convergence properties of Figure 10 by plotting two parameters in each graph. I show 3 snapshots of the simulations: at 500, 1000 and 2000 iterations. The dashed lines
intersect at the parameter values that generated the data. After 500 iterations (Panel A) almost all chains have converged to the high density region. The purple chain converges after 2000 iterations: this is because this chain corresponds to the 5th starting value, which is quite far from the parameter that generated the network. Table 4 reports the result

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Convergence Experiments, n = 50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Starting value: (-2.00,0.50,0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R=1000       R=2000       R=3000       R=5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ_1 -2.000   mean          -2.0165       -2.0643       -2.0772       -2.083864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.           0.2629        0.2018        0.1845        0.16355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mc s.e.       0.0125        0.0069        0.0063        0.00515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ_2 0.500    mean          0.5387        0.6083        0.6207        0.61584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.           0.5519        0.4435        0.4144        0.40764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mc s.e.       0.0338        0.0294        0.0189        0.02796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ_3 0.010    mean          0.0043        0.0121        0.0147        0.01756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.           0.0262        0.0201        0.0187        0.01656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mc s.e.       0.0002        0.0001        0.0001        0.00016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Starting value: (-10.0,5.0,1.0)         |
| true                                    |
| R=1000       R=2000       R=3000       R=5000 |
| θ_1 -2.000   mean          -2.0131       -2.0651       -2.0688       -2.06736 |
|              s.d.           0.2643        0.2013        0.1814        0.16555 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0137        0.0067        0.0057        0.00464 |
| θ_2 0.500    mean          0.5542        0.6181        0.6149        0.65714 |
|              s.d.           0.5506        0.4425        0.4228        0.40464 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0363        0.0279        0.029         0.022 |
| θ_3 0.010    mean          0.0041        0.0119        0.0143        0.01576 |
|              s.d.           0.0267        0.0201        0.0185        0.01676 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0002        0.0001        0.0001        0.00016 |

| Starting value: (10.0,-5.0,-1.0)        |
| true                                    |
| R=1000       R=2000       R=3000       R=5000 |
| θ_1 -2.000   mean          -2.0287       -2.0583       -2.0656       -2.06866 |
|              s.d.           0.2548        0.2072        0.1883        0.164 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0099        0.0081        0.0085        0.00434 |
| θ_2 0.500    mean          0.5723        0.6028        0.6275        0.65934 |
|              s.d.           0.5418        0.4473        0.4084        0.3844 |
|              mc s.e.       0.034         0.0224        0.0283        0.0207 |
| θ_3 0.010    mean          0.0058        0.0113        0.0128        0.0116 |
|              s.d.           0.0255        0.0211        0.0203        0.01676 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0002        0.0001        0.0001        0.00016 |

| Starting value: (-3.0,-0.05,0.3)        |
| true                                    |
| R=1000       R=2000       R=3000       R=5000 |
| θ_1 -2.000   mean          -2.016        -2.0727       -2.0884       -2.07246 |
|              s.d.           0.2574        0.2033        0.1842        0.1625 |
|              mc s.e.       0.01          0.0064        0.007         0.0051 |
| θ_2 0.500    mean          0.5612        0.5993        0.6354        0.65764 |
|              s.d.           0.5436        0.4442        0.4163        0.4044 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0346        0.027         0.0252        0.0256 |
| θ_3 0.010    mean          0.0047        0.0128        0.0158        0.0162 |
|              s.d.           0.0254        0.0205        0.0181        0.0165 |
|              mc s.e.       0.0002        0.0001        0.0001        0.0001 |

Convergence experiments using artificial data. The network contains n = 50 players and the data are generated by 1 million iterations of the simulation algorithm using the true parameters. The posterior is estimated using different lengths R of the network simulation algorithm. The table reports the estimated posterior mean, standard deviation and Monte Carlo standard error for the posterior mean.
of estimations using different network simulation lengths, with a network of \( n = 50 \) players. The table suggests that \( R = 1000 \) is maybe too small, while there is not much difference among the remaining estimation results. In Table 5, I show similar results for a network with \( n = 100 \) players and starting the simulations at a parameter vector \((-20.0,15.0,-0.3)\).\(^{47}\) For this network size, \( R = 3000 \) would suffice. This is the amount of simulation used in the empirical application.

In summary, convergence in this toy model is quite fast. For high-dimensional models convergence is slower, but reasonable, in the order of 50 or 100 thousands iterations. One possible strategy is to use a small \( R \) for the initial simulations: when the chain reaches approximate convergence we can increase the number of network simulations and estimate the posterior with higher precision.

### Table 5: Convergence Experiments, \( n = 100 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \theta_1 )</th>
<th>true</th>
<th>( R=1000 )</th>
<th>( R=3000 )</th>
<th>( R=5000 )</th>
<th>( R=10000 )</th>
<th>( R=30000 )</th>
<th>( R=50000 )</th>
<th>( R=100000 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>0.2613</td>
<td>0.1375</td>
<td>0.1101</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.0632</td>
<td>0.0703</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mcse</td>
<td>0.0111</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \theta_2 )</th>
<th>true ( R=500 )</th>
<th>( R=3000 )</th>
<th>( R=5000 )</th>
<th>( R=10000 )</th>
<th>( R=30000 )</th>
<th>( R=50000 )</th>
<th>( R=100000 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.5835</td>
<td>0.5627</td>
<td>0.5909</td>
<td>0.6475</td>
<td>0.6396</td>
<td>0.6201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>0.7119</td>
<td>0.3499</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.2751</td>
<td>0.2284</td>
<td>0.2612</td>
<td>0.3127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mcse</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.0176</td>
<td>0.0335</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.0253</td>
<td>0.0436</td>
<td>0.0364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \theta_3 )</th>
<th>true ( R=100 )</th>
<th>( R=3000 )</th>
<th>( R=5000 )</th>
<th>( R=10000 )</th>
<th>( R=30000 )</th>
<th>( R=50000 )</th>
<th>( R=100000 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.0096</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0111</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
<td>0.0124</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>0.0065</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mcse</td>
<td>0.000020</td>
<td>0.000005</td>
<td>0.000005</td>
<td>0.000007</td>
<td>0.000003</td>
<td>0.000005</td>
<td>0.000005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Convergence experiments using artificial data. The network contains \( n = 100 \) players and the data are generated by 1 million iterations of the simulation algorithm using the true parameters. The posterior is estimated using different lengths \( R \) of the network simulation algorithm. The table reports the estimated posterior mean, standard deviation and Monte Carlo standard error for the posterior mean.

### B.4 Parallel estimation with multiple networks

When data from multiple independent networks are available the estimation routines are easily adapted. Assume the researcher has data from \( C \) networks: let \( g_c \) and \( X_c \) denote the network matrix and the individual controls for network \( c, \ c = 1, \ldots, C \). The aggregate data are denoted as \( g = \{g_1, \ldots, g_c\} \) and \( X = \{X_1, \ldots, X_c\} \).

Assuming each network is drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model, each

\(^{47}\)Similar results hold for alternative starting values.
network has distribution

\[ \pi (g_c, X_c, \theta) = \frac{\exp \left[ Q (g_c, X_c, \theta) \right]}{\sum_{\omega \in \mathcal{G}} \exp \left[ Q (\omega, X_c, \theta) \right]} \]  

(58)

Since each network is independent, the likelihood of the data \((g, X)\) can be written as

\[ \pi (g, X, \theta) = \prod_{c=1}^{C} \pi (g_c, X_c, \theta) = \prod_{c=1}^{C} \left\{ \frac{\exp \left[ Q (g_c, X_c, \theta) \right]}{c (\mathcal{G}_c, X_c, \theta)} \right\} \]

\[ = \frac{\exp \left[ \sum_{c=1}^{C} Q (g_c, X_c, \theta) \right]}{\prod_{c=1}^{C} c (\mathcal{G}_c, X_c, \theta)} = \frac{\exp \left[ \sum_{c=1}^{C} Q (g_c, X_c, \theta) \right]}{C (\mathcal{G}, X, \theta)} \]

where \(\mathcal{G} = \bigcup_{c=1}^{C} \mathcal{G}_c\) and \(X = \{X_1, ..., X_C\}\). The likelihood for multiple independent networks is of the same form as the likelihood for one network observation. The structure of this likelihood makes parallelization extremely easy: each network can be simulated independently using the network simulation algorithm; at the end of the simulation we collect the last network and compute the potential; then we compute the sum of potentials and use it to compute the probability of update.

Therefore, the algorithm is modified as follows

**ALGORITHM 4 (Parallel FAST EXCHANGE ALGORITHM)**

Fix the number of simulations \(R\). Store each network data \((g_c, X_c)\) in a different processor/core. At each iteration \(t\), with current parameter \(\theta_t = \theta\) and network data \(g\)

1. Propose a new parameter \(\theta'\) from a distribution \(q_\theta (\cdot | \theta)\)

\[ \theta' \sim q_\theta (\cdot | \theta) \]  

(59)

2. For each processor \(c\), start **ALGORITHM 1** at the observed network \(g_c\), iterating for \(R\) steps using parameter \(\theta'\) and collect the last simulated network \(g'_c\)

\[ g'_c \sim P_{\theta'}^{(R)} (g'_c | g_c) \]  

(60)

3. Update the parameter according to

\[ \theta_{t+1} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \theta' & \text{with prob. } \alpha_{\text{pex}} (\theta, \theta') \\ \theta & \text{with prob. } 1 - \alpha_{\text{pex}} (\theta, \theta') \end{array} \right\} \]

where

\[ \alpha_{\text{pex}} (\theta, \theta') = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\exp \left[ \sum_{c=1}^{C} Q (g'_c, X_c, \theta) \right] p (\theta) q_\theta (\theta' | \theta) \exp \left[ \sum_{c=1}^{C} Q (g_c, X_c, \theta') \right]}{\exp \left[ \sum_{c=1}^{C} Q (g_c, X_c, \theta) \right] p (\theta) q_\theta (\theta' | \theta') \exp \left[ \sum_{c=1}^{C} Q (g'_c, X_c, \theta') \right]} \right\} \]  

(61)

The speed of the algorithm depends on the largest network in the data. Since each parameter update requires the result of each processor simulation there is some idle time, since small networks are simulated much faster.
B.5 Freeman Segregation Index

The Freeman segregation index measures the degree of segregation in a population with two groups (Freeman, 1972). Assume there are two groups, A and B. Let \( n_{AB} \) be the total number of links that individuals of group A form to individuals of group B. Let \( n_{BA}, n_{BB} \) and \( n_{AA} \) be analogously defined. The original index developed by Freeman (1972) is defined as

\[
FSI = \frac{\mathbb{E}[n_{AB}] + \mathbb{E}[n_{BA}] - (n_{AB} + n_{BA})}{\mathbb{E}[n_{AB}] + \mathbb{E}[n_{BA}]} \tag{62}
\]

When the link formation does not depend on the identity of individuals, then the links should be randomly distributed with respect to identity. Therefore, the index measures the difference between the expected and actual number of links among individuals of different groups, as a fraction of the expected links. An index of 0 means that the actual network closely resembles one in which links are formed at random. Higher values indicate more segregation. In this paper segregation is measured using the index \(^{48}\)

\[
SEG = \max \{0, FSI\} \tag{63}
\]

The index varies between 0 and 1, where the maximum corresponds to a network in which there are no cross-group links.

To complete the derivation of the index, the expected number of cross-group links is computed as

\[
\mathbb{E}[n_{AB}] = \frac{(n_{AA} + n_{AB})(n_{AB} + n_{BB})}{n_{AA} + n_{AB} + n_{BA} + n_{BB}}
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}[n_{BA}] = \frac{(n_{BA} + n_{BB})(n_{AA} + n_{BA})}{n_{AA} + n_{AB} + n_{BA} + n_{BB}}
\]

C Extensions

It is possible to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity or random coefficients in the model. However this would significantly increase the computational cost of estimation. The simplest way to introduce unobserved heterogeneity is to model the preference shock \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) as incorporating individual random effects. In our application of school friendship networks the unobserved quality of the student could be interpreted as ”coolness” or personality or

\(^{48}\)The index (62) varies between -1 and 1. However, the interpretation of the index when it assumes negative values is not clear. Therefore Freeman (1972) suggests to use only when it is nonnegative, to measure the presence of segregation.
attractiveness. The decision of the player to form a link is modified as follows

\[ U_i (g_{ij} = 1, g_{-ij}, X) + \eta_i + \eta_j + \nu_{ij1} \geq U_i (g_{ij} = 0, g_{-ij}, X) + \eta_i + \nu_{ij0} \]  

(64)

where \( \nu_{ij} \) is an i.i.d. shock with logistic distribution and the vector \( \eta = \{\eta_1, ..., \eta_n\} \) is drawn at time 0 from a known distribution \( W(\eta) \). In this formulation I assume that the players observe the random effect \( \eta \) but the econometrician does not. Notice that the random effect of player \( i \) cancels out, while the choice of linking \( j \) is conditional on the random effect of player \( j \) (which is present only when the link is formed).

Conditioning on the realization of the vector \( \eta \in \Upsilon \), the potential function is modified as follows

\[ Q (g, X, \theta; \eta) = Q (g, X, \theta) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} g_{ij} \eta_j \]  

(65)

To compute the unconditional likelihood we need to integrate out the unobserved vector \( \eta \) to obtain

\[ \pi (g, X, \theta) = \int_{\Upsilon} \frac{\exp \left[ Q (g, X, \theta; \eta) \right]}{\sum_{\omega \in \Theta} \exp \left[ Q (\omega, X, \theta; \eta) \right]} dW (\eta) \]  

(66)

The integral above can be computed using Monte Carlo techniques, as it is standard in the IO literature or labor economics. However, the model does not allow standard Monte Carlo, because of the normalizing constant.

A more feasible strategy is to use data augmentation and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods as in the discrete choice literature (Rossi et al. (1996), Athey and Imbens (2007)).

Conditioning on the realization of the unobserved component \( \eta \), we can use the exchange algorithm to sample from the posterior distribution of \( \theta \). Conditioning on the proposed \( \theta \) we can use a metropolis hastings step to sample the unobserved component \( \eta \).

Given an initial \((\theta, \eta)\) at simulation \( s \), we propose a new \( \theta' \) and use the exchange algorithm to accept or reject the proposal. Given the new value of \( \theta_{s+1} \), we propose a new vector of unobserved components \( \eta' \) and accept using a Metropolis Hastings step. The probability of \( \eta \), conditioning on \((\theta, g, X)\) is

\[ \Pr (\eta|g, X, \theta) = \frac{W (\eta) \pi (g, X, \theta; \eta)}{\pi (g, X, \theta)} \]  

(67)

The Metropolis-Hastings step proceeds by proposing a new \( \eta' \) from a distribution \( q_{\eta} (\eta'|\eta) \), which is accepted with probability

\[ \alpha_{\eta} (\eta, \eta', g, \theta_s) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1, & W (\eta') \pi (g, X, \theta; \eta') q_{\eta} (\eta'|\eta) \\ W (\eta) \pi (g, X, \theta; \eta) q_{\eta} (\eta'|\eta) & \end{array} \right. \]  

(68)
Similar ideas apply to random coefficients. One possibility is to estimate a specification with random coefficient at the network level.

\begin{equation}
\theta_p = \theta_{p0} + \sum_{c=1}^{C} \theta_{pc} Z_c + \xi_c
\end{equation}

(69)

where $Z_c$ is a network-level variable for network $c$, and $\xi_c \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\xi)$.

The estimation method is flexible enough to allow for estimation when there are missing links. The Add Health dataset could raise some concern about missing links, since the original questionnaire asks students to report up to 5 male and 5 female friends. If a student has more than 5 male friends, those are missing from the dataset.

Using the Bayesian algorithm provided in this paper one could easily deal with the missing links. The algorithm can be modified to include an additional simulation step that generates the missing links $g_{mis}$, given the observed network data $g_{obs}$ and the current parameter vector. Then the algorithm proceeds with the exchange algorithm as before using the augmented data $g = \{g_{mis}, g_{obs}\}$.

The main cost of these extensions is the increased computational burden, which may be substantial.